3 ms·

I'm not sure I understand what you mean. One channel is registered per server, for one name. Successful registrations require a super majority of those registra

I'm not sure I understand what you mean. One channel is registered per server, for one name. Successful registrations require a super majority of those registrations to succeed. Lookups can be limited to a sub-set as long as the result number is at least greater than the minimum failure threshold for a successful registration. >Yes, but an attacker can use a different channel name for the same domain. >An attacker could associate their own key with that domain any number of times How?

charcircuit 3y ago
>How? You literally just register the name again. In the rare chance you conflict just reroll the random nonce and try again.
- Uptrenda 3y ago
  The nonce isnt random. It's deterministic.
  - charcircuit 3y ago
    The time lock is pointless then. This is what I meant by random crypto making it hard to understand. This blog post would be simpler to understand if you started out without any crypto. If I were to write it I would start with the case of a single IRC server. Then explain a channel is a key and the topic is the value. The first person to register a key on a server can control the value. Then to expand this approach to multiple severs you introduce the idea of using a kdf of the key concatenated with the irc server's identity.
    - Uptrenda 3y ago
      The time-lock acts as a way to ensure names aren't revealed the moment channels are registered which would create a race condition where attackers could hijack names by registering them on other servers. The channel name is something like time_lock(name_meta_data, server_details) -> deterministic channel name based on the parameters passed to the function (output is unique per server.) Just like if you used a hash function you get the same output for the same input. Since the time lock needs a certain amount of compute to elapse (and a certain amount of time to do it) -- it allows time for the name owner to register the appropriate channels on other servers.

charcircuit 3y ago

>How? You literally just register the name again. In the rare chance you conflict just reroll the random nonce and try again.

Uptrenda 3y ago
The nonce isnt random. It's deterministic.
- charcircuit 3y ago
  The time lock is pointless then. This is what I meant by random crypto making it hard to understand. This blog post would be simpler to understand if you started out without any crypto. If I were to write it I would start with the case of a single IRC server. Then explain a channel is a key and the topic is the value. The first person to register a key on a server can control the value. Then to expand this approach to multiple severs you introduce the idea of using a kdf of the key concatenated with the irc server's identity.
  - Uptrenda 3y ago
    The time-lock acts as a way to ensure names aren't revealed the moment channels are registered which would create a race condition where attackers could hijack names by registering them on other servers. The channel name is something like time_lock(name_meta_data, server_details) -> deterministic channel name based on the parameters passed to the function (output is unique per server.) Just like if you used a hash function you get the same output for the same input. Since the time lock needs a certain amount of compute to elapse (and a certain amount of time to do it) -- it allows time for the name owner to register the appropriate channels on other servers.