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There is 0 security in this. It is also hard to understand because it uses random crypto that doesn't really accomplish anything. Nothing stops someone from re
by charcircuit 3y ago
There is 0 security in this. It is also hard to understand because it uses random crypto that doesn't really accomplish anything.
Nothing stops someone from registering your domain. Nothing stops someone from doing a Sybil attack and just always returning an attacker's account public key.
The author would be benefit greatly by taking another look at blockchains for this problem. They typically are much better thought out distributed systems than what the author was able to come up with.
- Uptrenda 3y ago>There is 0 security in this. It is also hard to understand because it uses random crypto that doesn't really accomplish anything. There is zero security if you dismiss every such measure to accomplish a level of security by saying that its just 'random crypto' that doesn't accomplish anything (why do you say that?) >Nothing stops someone from registering your domain. Nothing stops someone from doing a Sybil attack and just always returning an attacker's account public key. I think there may be some confusion in your understanding of the system. Registered names aren't visible, only their hashes. The design masks names through a verifiable delay function which forces registering parties to do lengthy computations to construct the lookup function. Since computations can be stored in bulk - names can be registered atomically across IRC servers without revealing what they are directly. >Nothing stops someone from doing a Sybil attack and just always returning an attacker's account public key. In the context of networking 'sybils' refer to being able to create multiple identities, machines, or so on controlled by the same person. But your usage of the term here is confusing because (1) users don't control third-party servers (2) users can't see names directly (3) there is a cost to creating names (4) and a threshold system is used to do consensus over name lookups and registrations (which was designed to solve the problem you're talking about.) >The author would be benefit greatly by taking another look at blockchains for this problem. They typically are much better thought out distributed systems than what the author was able to come up with. I would love to use a blockchain for this. There's only one problem. Currently there are no such blockchains that have zero transaction fees to use them. I think that such a system would be very useful. But it seems that no one wants to do it -- and working at blockchain startups for more than a decade has taught me that bolting forced monetization and funky tokens onto everything can make a system worse (or even unusable) for its intended purpose. I think if you re-read the post you will see how I've addressed the problems you raised.
- charcircuit 3y ago>why do you say that? Because the information needed to lookup a name is equivalent to the information needed to register the name. >Registered names aren't visible, only their hashes. But domains are public information. Imagine if in normal DNS anyone could register google.com at any time. Claiming that its not insecure because people don't know google.com exists doesn't make sense. >names can be registered atomically across IRC servers without revealing what they are directly. But if someone learns the name they can register it themself. Two people can both claim to be google.com. If a new IRC server is added anyone can create a channel for an existing domain. If your answer to the problem of the same domain being registered by multiple people is that a domain should be both a name and an encrypted nonce you run into the problem where it might be more convienent to just pass over the public key. >But your usage of the term here is confusing That is my fault, I assumed this was a permissionless system where any IRC server was permitted to be used instead of a permissioned one. >Currently there are no such blockchains that have zero transaction fees to use them. Some cost near $0. A fork of one could be made to do so.
- Uptrenda 3y agoThe channel names are unique per server. Knowing the channel name isn't enough to infer what name it represents so you can't just go and register the name on other servers after observing channel names. The only way to know what a channel name represents is to do a lengthy computation for a possible name, tld, password (optional), and server. Depending on uniqueness -- this might not be practical. The idea of having masked names was only to prevent race conditions in the initial registration process. After the channel names are registered they are unavailable for other attackers to register and since a verifiable delay has to be done on the name to compute it -- there is adequate time to register the name across multiple servers. A malicious server can reuse a channel name and have it hijacked by an operator. But the system also ties in ECDSA signatures with a basic threshold consensus algorithm across servers. So having a few servers (or even many) wouldn't allow a malicious third-party to compromise a name.
- charcircuit 3y ago