They chose to embrace a razor-blades model-- they sold their soul chasing the consumer market. People trusted HP printers at the high-end of the market, where

They chose to embrace a razor-blades model-- they sold their soul chasing the consumer market. People trusted HP printers at the high-end of the market, where words like "TCO" and "duty cycle" matter. That could scale that down to the "prosumer" end of the market very easily. They were pretty close to that already, with the LaserJet 6P and similar. I can recall my first job used two big networked HPs for the bulk printing, and a 6P for a special case (a few dozen sheets per day printing cheques with MICR toner). Despite the hundreds of pages per day volume we ran, the printers were pretty bulletproof. They also missed the opportunity to take control of a new market: the "second printer" buyer. Target the people who took the "free" or dirt-cheap inkjet printer that came with a PC bundle. When they're fed up with 25 pages per cartridge, using three colours to print black, and drivers that are clearly a less whimsical GlaDOS, you can be there to say "now that you've learned why a $300 printer is worth it, here's one explicitly engineered to solve your pain points." Brother has now successfully captured this market entirely through word of mouth. One would expect that's the long-term play: selling $49 inkjets was like deciding to double-down on manufacturing 56k winmodems: it might do well in 1998, when the market is flooded with first-time customers taking the cheapest thing they can get, but it doesn't provide you a place to take your brand as customer expectations march upwards.