> From what I can tell, Wire Guard is based on that story, since it doesn't include any session-time negotiation of ciphers, etc. Wireguard exchanges keys prio

> From what I can tell, Wire Guard is based on that story, since it doesn't include any session-time negotiation of ciphers, etc. Wireguard exchanges keys prior using well trusted implementations, and common "wireguard-implemented-tools" facilitate key generation and exchange on top of that. This is sane, and only vulnerable to supply-chain attacks in libsodium, or key leaks at either: a) compromised host (so that host can decrypt incoming traffic) or b) the key-exchange mechanism, for which open source implementations exist e.g., Nebula / Tailscale. Regardless ... Given that it is in addition to ssh (it's ssh over wireguard, not ssh or wireguard), I find any arguments against a wide class of encryption standards to be not very compelling. With ssh + wireguard you need state-level hacks on libsodium and ssh vulnerabilities to have a general-purpose attack like you see with the Snowden stuff However, this is important context.