4 ms·

> If there is any guiding light to the randomness, any pattern to how the random choices come out, then it's not really random, is it? Well, yeah, that's the p

> If there is any guiding light to the randomness, any pattern to how the random choices come out, then it's not really random, is it? Well, yeah, that's the point. By definition, a deterministic model of reality means there is no room for a free agent to make decisions: things couldn't have worked out another way. But a mechanism that appears random provides at least the potential for a free agent, since randomness is exactly what it looks like when you cannot predict system outputs purely from system inputs. It's really a semantic issue. It's not that it's a source of randomness that we're after in order for free will to be possible, but rather non-causality, and quantum mechanics does provide some potential in that regard.

dotsam 3y ago
I find the idea of computational irreducibility useful for rescuing a type of free will in a fully determined world. Computationally irreducible programs are perfectly deterministic, yet you can't predict the output before you run them, and nor are there any shortcuts to get there before running them for the first time. The program running in our brains for 'free will' can be computationally irreducible in this way. No-one can say with perfect accuracy what we will choose to do in advance, not even us. For me, this kind of free will is enough, though it is rather deflationary when compared to some kind of godlike non-causal free will. I think that if we search for non-causal free will, we lose any hope of explanation or understanding: presumably if it's non-causal, then anything can happen, for no reason.
- featuregag 3y ago
  This interpretation is very interesting to me. Do you know of any other philosophical or scientific research into the relationship between computational complexity / reducibility and free will?
  - dotsam 3y ago
    Stephen Wolfram's discussion of free will in his book A New Kind of Science is the most relevant: https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-free-will/ https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f... Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained comes at the problem from a similar angle.
- nwiswell 3y ago
  I don't think this concept is helpful, honestly. If the brain is deterministic, then you would be able to fully simulate it in a regular von Neumann computer, and as a result you'd be able to predict someone's actions and choices with perfect accuracy, which leaves no space for any agency or "ghost in the machine".
  - dotsam 3y ago
    How do you predict what the full simulation will do, before you run it for the first time? If it is computationally irreducible, then you can't predict the outcome - the only way to know what will happen is to run the computation and see what happens. And this computation, this full simulation, is a person with free agency. They are just running on a non-biological computational substrate.
    - nwiswell 3y ago
      How can you have two persons with free agency that always make the same decision? Or a hundred such persons? The calculation itself may be irreducible, but what is the implication for consciousness and agency if, midway through the calculation, you fork the process? What about a quarter of the way, or three quarters?
      - dotsam 3y ago
        Then you have n free and conscious agents! And yes, if their simulated environments were identical, then the copies would all make identical decisions (all the copies would still have the same conscious experiences of free will that you and I have). Whilst this feels unsatisfactory, it is the only way I can see of talking about agency without invoking decision-making processes that disobey the laws of physics, or rely on randomness. And unless a supernatural version of free will appeals, I think this is the best kind of free will available: governed by rules, but nevertheless fundamentally unpredictable. The only other option would be to rely on complete randomness as a basis for decisions, which seems worse.
        3y ago

dotsam 3y ago

I find the idea of computational irreducibility useful for rescuing a type of free will in a fully determined world. Computationally irreducible programs are perfectly deterministic, yet you can't predict the output before you run them, and nor are there any shortcuts to get there before running them for the first time. The program running in our brains for 'free will' can be computationally irreducible in this way. No-one can say with perfect accuracy what we will choose to do in advance, not even us. For me, this kind of free will is enough, though it is rather deflationary when compared to some kind of godlike non-causal free will. I think that if we search for non-causal free will, we lose any hope of explanation or understanding: presumably if it's non-causal, then anything can happen, for no reason.

featuregag 3y ago
This interpretation is very interesting to me. Do you know of any other philosophical or scientific research into the relationship between computational complexity / reducibility and free will?
- dotsam 3y ago
  Stephen Wolfram's discussion of free will in his book A New Kind of Science is the most relevant: https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-free-will/ https://www.wolframscience.com/nks/p750--the-phenomenon-of-f... Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained comes at the problem from a similar angle.
nwiswell 3y ago
I don't think this concept is helpful, honestly. If the brain is deterministic, then you would be able to fully simulate it in a regular von Neumann computer, and as a result you'd be able to predict someone's actions and choices with perfect accuracy, which leaves no space for any agency or "ghost in the machine".
- dotsam 3y ago
  How do you predict what the full simulation will do, before you run it for the first time? If it is computationally irreducible, then you can't predict the outcome - the only way to know what will happen is to run the computation and see what happens. And this computation, this full simulation, is a person with free agency. They are just running on a non-biological computational substrate.
  - nwiswell 3y ago
    How can you have two persons with free agency that always make the same decision? Or a hundred such persons? The calculation itself may be irreducible, but what is the implication for consciousness and agency if, midway through the calculation, you fork the process? What about a quarter of the way, or three quarters?
    - dotsam 3y ago
      Then you have n free and conscious agents! And yes, if their simulated environments were identical, then the copies would all make identical decisions (all the copies would still have the same conscious experiences of free will that you and I have). Whilst this feels unsatisfactory, it is the only way I can see of talking about agency without invoking decision-making processes that disobey the laws of physics, or rely on randomness. And unless a supernatural version of free will appeals, I think this is the best kind of free will available: governed by rules, but nevertheless fundamentally unpredictable. The only other option would be to rely on complete randomness as a basis for decisions, which seems worse.
      - 3y ago