I think it's irrelevant what people "know", if that's not how they act. It doesn't matter that people know a fruit isn't human if they act like it is in ways,

I think it's irrelevant what people "know", if that's not how they act. It doesn't matter that people know a fruit isn't human if they act like it is in ways, because how people interact with the world is the only thing that actually matters. If you always act like the bear with a hat has some level of feelings even if you don't believe it, that's functionally identical to actually believing it, so any difference is irrelevant. No matter how much they express they know it has no feelings, if they feel bad or feel bad for it if it's destroyed, what's more true, what they said or how they actually responded? Most people don't act like things have feeling all the time, or to the same level as a living being might have feelings, but many people do it to a degree. Given that much of how we feel is immediate (and thus not reasoned), subconscious, and sometimes Pavlovian, I don't think it's a stretch to think that even acting like an inanimate object has feelings or human traits regularly might lead towards subconscious feelings about it that are not entirely rational or immediately understood by the person. For a slightly different argument, consider why it's generally considered good advice not to name the animals meant for slaughter. Or how people treat cars or large pieces of equipment that aren't always reliable (are "temperamental"), or that are tightly linked to safety and livelihood, such as boats. We are social animals. We bond to others easily by our nature, because it's beneficial for survival. I think we do it so easily that it extends towards animals, often to good effect, but sometimes even to inanimate objects that have a lot of significance. In the past this seems to even have been extended to weapons and armor, given the number of named items in history.