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Cybersecurity Isn't Special
- everdrive 3y agoI think this article makes a lot of good points, but those are overshadowed by the tone, and the seemingly personal grievance regarding security holding up software. In this specific sense, I think the article misses the mark. Many of the criticisms made about cybersecurity are valid, however whether or not they are valid does not really have much to do with whether they should be holding up software more, or less. This primarily seems like a problem of incentive: the security folks are not incentivized to help move the software along. They're incentivized to find issues, and when erring on the side of caution, hold up software deployment. And this holds true even if, as the author claims, the cybersecurity field is full of puffed-up pseudo-intellectuals.
- surge 3y agoWe're paid to find risk and reduce risk. Software developers and project leads are paid to ship product, even if its held together by glue and duct tape. The problem is they don't have security and risk reduction in their incentives and automation, and they should, call it DevSecOps or whatever. After all, availability is one of the areas of security, but that usually falls on operations.
- abhiminator 3y ago>We're paid to find risk and reduce risk. There's a dedicated department that already does that in most organizations -- risk management. One could argue that 'cybersecurity' ought to be a component of 'risk management' versus being on its own which only adds to bloated organization structure and increases bureaucratic complexity.
- surge 3y agoYeah, and my team and larger cyber org was under risk management, until some new exec decided to shift us under the technology org (a decision I do not agree with due to conflict of interest).
- kstrauser 3y agoAt my last shop, we were under Risk, IT, Security, and Compliance, aka RISC.
- genmud 3y agoIn some orgs, that is the case. In other orgs, risk management might be a functionally absent, with legal teams being reviewers of contracts and abdicating that role to outside counsel.
- everdrive 3y agoTo be clear I'm not necessarily agreeing with the author's claims that cybersecurity is all puff and BS. I'm just arguing that even if we take the author's point, it feels a bit oblique to his primary grievance.
- NovemberWhiskey 3y ago>his ... her.
- NovemberWhiskey 3y agoThis dichotomy sounds on point, but it's not. Software has distinct functional requirements for which you can test in a concrete way, either at a technical level, within a business, or in a competitive way in the marketplace. It's therefore possible to know what's "good" or "not" and in many cases to know who is a "good software engineer" or not. Cybersecurity isn't like that. It's often hard to tell valuable cybersecurity practices from useless ones, because it's almost impossible to test them, and the practice of defense-in-depth means that useless activities are often piled on top of useful ones. The target for cybersecurity should be "just good enough", but there's no feedback because "just good enough" has the same outcome as "pointless vendor quackery cargo cult review hell" for the objective function.
- surge 3y ago"Just good enough" is a constantly moving target. Its a bit like tech debt, what's good enough one year isn't the next, being PCI compliant doesn't keep you from getting customer cc #'s stolen. Just good enough is also a question of risk appetite. If the business decides it wants to "accept the risk" rather than take whatever measures necessary to remediate a risk, that's up to them.
- NovemberWhiskey 3y agoNo; you see, that's the same problem. Software orgs don't have a problem with changing requirements; that's the nature of the beast. Cybersecurity organizations usually have no idea what "just good enough" is, for the reasons I stated. So you end up with commercially impractical security requirements, and then vigorous sucking of teeth and requests for "compensating controls" (usually: do something equally impractical) and then demands that the business "accept the risk". I've worked with a bunch of people in "compliance" professions (like line 2 compliance teams in banks, operational risk teams) but this attitude is significantly more common in cybersecurity than in other cases.
- surge 3y agoOh, your problem is you don't have anyone doing risk assessments (see Risk Matrix for an example) and quantitative risk analysis and measuring cost to fix vs likelihood of occurrence and cost of an incident against that fix over an extended period. It's a bit like an in house insurance adjustment. Tangentially, a lot of companies decide to buy insurance as a "fix" for a risk. Because the insurance costs less than implementing whatever solution is required. Just good enough often times is an orgs own policies and standards, and security teams catch when things aren't meeting those standards. Your complaints are a lack of maturity in your cyber security organizations. There are cases where a business can absolutely decide its "good enough". But that decision is made by people other than those that point out the vulnerability. It's usually done by which ever team handles security remediation or they talk to someone who handles that analysis as part of the remediation process if the fix seems prohibitive. Cost to fix can also go down as new solutions become available or infrastructure changes and a new design makes it easier to build in a fix/control/detection or whatever. So re-evaluating "accepted risks" periodically to see if its something that's easier to implement is also part of it. Cybersecurity shouldn't be in the business of saying no (unless its something insane like storing passwords in plain text on open shares), we're here to say, "here's some problems we see", here's where we think we can help, everything else is up to the frameworks and policies your company has set to adhere to or someone at a higher level to say cost exceeds risk, we accept the risk until such point cost comes down, etc. Cyber should also be helping to put in systematic controls that make good controls the default, and good practices easy to implement, so that ops and devs don't have to think about it.
- surge 3y agoSounds like someone is tired of getting dinged for using outdated security practices in their application designs. I came from the other side of things. I know what its like, but the fact they care more about features and not fixing vulnerabilities or designing applications to have good security is a failing on their end. Shift left, do it early, so we're not finding it right when the product is getting ready to ship when its finally in a form ready to review. >3. Build standardized patterns. Yeah, you can have them, but then the various project teams don't follow them or even look at them during the design. Then wonder why its being reported later. Are they kept accountable when they don't follow the prescribed patterns and it causes project delays when its called out? No. It's our fault for road blocking. >4. Abandon the perimeter model. Uh yeah, we talk about zero trust but its the app teams saying "its an internal application, not publicly accessible so its not a big deal if there's no encryption or credentials are stored in the clear" in their arguments to why its not an issue or they shouldn't have to fix it. >5. Advise, don’t dictate. I can not speak for every place, but we recommend solutions and call them "Recommendations" but if there's another better solution to reducing the risk we're not the SME's in your product, as long as it adequately remediates the issues through some sort of control, detection, or fix, it's not really for us to say how its done. >6. Ask platform teams to integrate security. They're not interested, they're interested in copying and pasting code from past applications with the same old/bad practices. They even bring practices into new platforms that have great solutions for managing a risk (such as credential storage) and do it the old way (keep creds in a config file that ships with the artifact). Cybersecurity isn't special, but its the developers (not all) IME that treat it like it is and not part of their job responsibilities.
- NovemberWhiskey 3y agoI feel this entire blog post very deeply.
- abixb 3y agoSeems like a rage-bait title, but I kind of agree with the general premise that cybersecurity teams shouldn't treat themselves as solving unique problems that other auxiliary teams (like SRE/platform engineering) haven't already come across and/or already solved. I am of the opinion that this massive push by big organizations (coupled with mandates for C-suite roles like CISO) into building a dedicated army of staffers for "cybersecurity" feels like just another attempt to bloat up the size of an organization and create more 'bullshit' jobs, as David Graeber put it over half a decade ago.
- hazmazlaz 3y agoExcept the fallacy with this premise is that the other teams _haven't_ solved the problems, which is why the cybersecurity teams are necessary in the first place. Cybersecurity doesn't solve any problems that are inherent to computing and are unavoidable, cybersecurity solves problems that are created by the mistakes of other teams. It's an unfortunate truth and it's difficult for many people to swallow, but I have found in my career, which is nearly 20 years at this point, that this is true in every case that I have personally experienced. That is to say, if developers created secure software by design, and if infrastructure teams/operations teams handled their assets and processes in a secure manner, then there would be no need for cybersecurity outside of a few specialized roles.
- slt2021 3y agothe actual reason for mandating companies to spend on cyber is because they are cutting costs on SRE/Ops by outsourcing all KTLO work to India and other offshore countries. If you ever looked at average S&P500 company IT Budget, there will be nontrivial amount dedicated to WITCH (Wipro Infosys Tata Cognizant HCL and friends) for outsourced KTLO work. This makes it impossible to do anything meaningful de-novo on a high level, like create a good security architecture as a platform for all dev teams, or adopt a new security platform. Outsourced companies do only a piece work on a ticket by ticket basis and require very specific instructions upfront. Mandating companies to keep inhouse cyber staff makes it possible to grow talent inhouse and do high level designs of platforms to keep stuff secure
- 3y ago
- slt2021 3y agoFully agree with the author, the often quoted CIA (Confidentiality Integrity Availability) actually belongs to the SRE platform's concern. What I often see however, is SRE teams keep extremely understaffed (because "cost center") and often outsourced to offshore contractor in India - this basically means you can only keep the lights on via SRE team and cannot do anything else. If you have a competent and fully staffed SRE Platform engineering team - you will NOT need a separate cybersecurity team. But if company decided to cut costs on SRE folks, they then will have to invest heavily in cybersecurity team. At least because of mandated regulation (FedRAMP SOX HIPAA GDPR compliance disclosure etc) - it is easier to justify cyber budget, than the SRE budget Plus recent laws mandate having CISO as a high level executive (chief incident scapegoat officer) with huge budget and disclosure of recent hacks etc
- pizzalife 3y ago>If you have a competent and fully staffed SRE Platform engineering team - you will NOT need a separate cybersecurity team. So the SRE team is supposed to find vulnerabilities in the codebase and pentest the network?
- slt2021 3y agoI am gonna surprise you, but nobody from cybersecurity is finding vulnerabilities either. ALL of cybersecurity is just operating and configuring a platform, whether it is Qualys or Snyk or Wiz or something else. "cyber" people are basically TOOL MONKEYS, and if SRE people can handle operating and configuring kubernetes - they sure as hell are capable of operating and configuring Qualys and Snyk and Wyz platforms. Pentest is the same, I have not met any inhouse dedicated pentest folks, it is always third party contractor hired as needed for a short period of time. All inhouse fulltime cyber engineers are dedicated to blue team operations, rather than red team operations.
- opt-skept 3y agoAs part of the industry, I can tell you I've personally found dozens (hundreds?) of vulnerabilities per year for the more than decade running of my career. The same is true of my collegues. I have met "cybersecurity teams" who are "tool monkeys" in the way you suggest. Usually these individuals are part of an extended compliance team. They are trying to check compliance boxes by having some level of automated scanning, because their parent organization/team can't/won't staff professionals capable of this or capable of scaling it or focusing attention on where it matters. I don't want to oust you for where you work or your role within those companies - but really surprised to hear that there's no inhouse pentesting and no in house red teaming. I haven't worked at a company yet (on my fourth) that matches the experience you described.
- kstrauser 3y agoSummary: "don't be bad at cybersecurity". Cybersecurity is special in a real sense: it's one of the few groups typically charged with enforcing required compliance controls. I was a senior engineer for many years before moving full-time into security, and it's amazing how many of those annoying inconveniences are actually mandated from external customers or frameworks[0]. As an engineer, I don't really care if every PR has an associated Linear/Jira/whatever ticket; sometimes it's enough to say "I'm fixing this thing because it needs to be fixed". As a compliance person, SOC2 says that all change requests must have an associated ticket, and my personal feelings about that aren't part of the equation.[1] Think Security is a pain in the neck? Work in a regulated industry like healthcare or finance where you have lawyers instead of colleagues giving you a list of commandments. Also, I've never slept so well as I did the month after I was allowed to hire my CISO replacement. It's like looking up and seeing the Milky Way instead of the Sword of Damocles. [0] Having worked at shops where Security didn't take time to explain those things, I've vowed never to be that person. If I ask you to do a thing, I'll tell you why it's something we have to do. We should all collectively be better about that. [1] Although there's an analogy between "compliance" and "unit testing". A side benefit of thorough test coverage is that you tend to write better structured, more loosely coupled, easily testable code. That's all good to have even if you never ran a single test. Same with compliance. The ability to audit all the things means you're more likely to design your systems so that they can be inspected, instrumented, and monitored. In the "where's the ticket?" audit case, know what's more annoying than having to match every PR to a specific ticket? Having to individually assess a couple hundred exceptions to very that each of them reflects a reasonable judgment to violate the guidelines.
- lukeasrodgers 3y ago> As a compliance person, SOC2 says that all change requests must have an associated ticket Does soc2 actually say this? IIRC their spec docs are proprietary so chumps like myself can’t actually read them. But a (imo great) SOC2 auditor I worked with previously allowed us to treat GitHub PRs as their own sufficient justification. We still used Jira for most, but for minor fixes, quick upgrades, no Jira necessary. A former coworker said they did the same at a previous job. I think, in this particular case, it isn’t SOC2’s fault, it is the fault of auditors who are afraid to not just do what everyone else does.
- pizzalife 3y ago"It really doesn’t make sense for cybersecurity to have its own special snowflake process for things. It does not make sense operationally, philosophically, or socially." In general, I believe it does - cybersecurity is unique in the sense that you're dealing with intelligent adversaries that are actively trying to break your code. It's not like SRE work or normal software engineering. But there's also a lot of snake oil in the industry and most "cybersecurity" professionals don't actually know how to find vulnerabilities. "Attackers accessing our systems without our consent is one type of failure, but not the only kind. Reliability failures are arguably both more frequent and more damaging when they occur". This will completely depend on your product, but I've seen this sentiment across industries. "Risk = probability * impact" doesn't work when you throw security into the mix. The author sounds like a very common type of software developer who takes security issues in their code like a personal attack.
- surge 3y agoI agree with this, finding vulnerabilities is really hard, and there's people coming out of college with no experience anywhere else in the field trying to get high paying jobs looking for vulns in technology they don't understand or have never worked with. One of the best vulns I've ever remediated was one discovered by an application developer in their own authentication that was prescribed by our platform. He knew it was a problem and knew it needed to be fixed, but knew he needed us to report it before a fire got lit under the appropriate people's butts to make it get fixed.
- bb88 3y ago> The author sounds like a very common type of software developer who takes security issues in their code like a personal attack. She herself is a cyber security expert, so congratulations on attacking the messenger I guess?
- pizzalife 3y agoOh word? Because the only CVE I find when I google the author's name is this: https://www.fastly.com/blog/cve-2023-30534-insecure-deserialization-in-cacti-prior-to-1-2-25 https://www.fastly.com/blog/cve-2023-30534-insecure-deserial... An unexploitable PHP bug that five people decided to share the credit on.
- opt-skept 3y agoI'm on two sides about this article. The first side is that ultimately the argument that the author debunks is a strawman argument, and the counter-arguments are equally sophomoric. The second side is that I agree with the author on (some) of the recommendations and I think its great that the author made recommendations, instead of just pointing out perceived problems. Cybersecurity isn't special. At least not any more special than any other subfield is in its own way. But the rest of the article doesn't follow from this axiomatic position. In fact, it's irrelevant to the meat of the article (the recommendations), and comes across to me as griping. I think the article misses some of the realities of the business environment. Why do (some) security teams (sometimes) try to put in roadblocks to software releases? Usually it is because the the release is going to have a business impact for which: (a) the business has not acknowledged (b) no person is accountable for (c) there are no plans for. Why do security teams feel they must dictate outcomes rather than recommend? Usually because their leaders (running up the the Board or Executives) are holding the security team accountable for outcomes they have only indirect control over. Another common reason is that the incentive structures of various organizations push for development groups to release as quickly as possible, feature release estimates rarely include security work estimates, and teams/managers feel pressure to release anyway to avoid delaying due to missed work estimation at the project start. Usually, these kinds of issues represent the failings of other structural aspects of the business. Ideally security teams wouldn't be needed at all, the same as SREs and many other kinds of roles. Ostensibly developers would be so capable, so knowledgeable, so well rounded, so careful, that they would plan for, mitigate and manage all operational risks on their own. There's depths to explore on this topic. I'm excited for the article author that they are just starting to get introduced to it. I hope they continue to explore this as they develop more seniority and experience, and share in more detailed public posts as they go along.
- intern4tional 3y agoI think there is one other unaccounted aspect that the article doesn't acknowledge. I've never seen a SRE lead go to prison for an outage, but as of late a few CISOs have been charged, convicted, and sentenced to prison for failings on their watch. Cybersecurity may not be special but the results of a failing there are unique compared to SRE work.
- throwaway892238 3y ago> It really doesn’t make sense for cybersecurity to have its own special snowflake process for things. It does not make sense operationally, philosophically, or socially. It does not make sense to sustain systems resilience. And it even does not make sense for software security. Sorry, but it actually does make sense in multiple ways. Firstly, the core purpose of cybersecurity in the C-suite is to ensure the bottom line. System resilience is not the priority, the priority is the stock price. That means that it's way more important to triage an issue, collect evidence, determine impact, and see how many ways you can legally hide evidence or manipulate the situation to deny you ever even had a security incident. The quieter it stays, the smaller the impact to the bottom line. Keeping compromises to a minimum, improving UX, meeting modern best practices, etc are like the farthest things from their minds. And the people who run the company dictate what these teams prioritize. So to "the company", there's a good reason why they focus on their own thing. Secondly, security is really frickin' hard. Humans are not great at being masters of many things. You need a specialist who understands security well, and has the tools, and training, to do security-specific things. Why do you think "platform teams" (aka the new-new-sysadmins) exist and we don't just have developers build their own platform? Because there's ops crap in there that devs will never know, and shouldn't need to. Humans work more efficiently when they can focus on specific things, keep context switching to a minimum, and maximize their specific knowledge to a small domain. That includes security tools, practices, policies, etc. Thirdly, because of the competing priorities of security, and the specialization needed to truly do it well, you have to have a "security process" that people who aren't security experts can follow. You also want a "security process" because processes in general are useful tools to keep things working correctly. Even "security people" should be following a "security process". And there needs to be "security people" to come up with the process (ideally in collaboration with the other teams). What you don't want is bad process, or bad teams, or bad special snowflake solutions, etc. You want it to be supportive of other parts of the business, rather than a hindrance. That's what DevOps is all about - getting people to collaborate together, enabling self-service, increasing efficiency, improving quality, reducing waste, etc, etc, etc. You can do that with security too, and it doesn't mean you have to get rid of your security teams/solutions.
- senectus1 3y agothis whole blog post suffers from the point of view that security is a state. its not. its a process. It never ends, and you need to work at it constantly. or to put it in common terms : Its about the journey not the destination.
- bawolff 3y agoI think the distinction between cybersecurity and sre is that cybersecurity risk is much harder to quantify. Cybersecurity is full of things that are both very unlikely and very bad if they happen. What is the risk of some vuln burried deep in the stack that likely nobody will ever notice and even if they did even more unlikely they can further use it as a pivot point? Hard to say, but maybe close to zero unless you are a company that people specificly target. At the same time it can be a business ending risk. With SRE , even in the absolute worst case you can spin up new servers. You can't unleak your customers sensitive data. I think cybersecurity is hard because we are uniquely bad at evaluating cybersecurity risk which means we are bad at figuring out what appropriate mitgating action is
- staunton 3y ago> I think cybersecurity is hard because we are uniquely bad at evaluating cybersecurity risk It's not that hard to evaluate. The risk is high! Pretty much anything can be hacked if you try hard enough... What's hard is everything else. It's hard to accept. It's impossible to quantify. It's hard to justify caring about it. It's hard to care. It's hard.
- bawolff 3y ago"Cybersecurity" isn't a single risk, its a collection of risks. Some high, some low, many unclear. > It's hard to accept. From context you probably mean a different meaning of "accept", but accepting cybersecurity risk is actually super easy ;)
- genmud 3y agoCool, I agree with the author in concept, but there are so many goddamn engineers that ship incorrect/buggy/insecure software that if it wasn't its own function, nobody would even pretend to care. In my experience, most Project/Product/Program Managers sure as shit aren't going to prioritize it. Not every org is FAANG. Unfortunately in many (most) organizations, in house developers get caught quite frequently eating the metaphorical security crayons.
- cbsmith 3y agoAs per the point of the author though... tell me that platform/infra/devops/SRE is any different in this regard? The stuff I have to do to keep people from eating infrastructure crayons...
- genmud 3y agoThey are similar, but different. Like ops is similar to eng, but different. For one, they can quantify downtime easier. Also, in most orgs, cybersecurity is responsible/accountable for the problems, but only can indirectly influence things.
- cbsmith 3y ago> For one, they can quantify downtime easier. I don't understand this. The metric for downtime doesn't matter who is measuring it. > Also, in most orgs, cybersecurity is responsible/accountable for the problems, but only can indirectly influence things. Right, so very much like platform/infra/devops/SRE. ;-)
- tamimio 3y ago> I’ll excoriate special snowflake security programs If you think cybersec engineers think of themselves as special snowflakes, you should work with robotics engineers :)
- andersonmvd 3y agoThe goal of cybersecurity should be to align cybersecurity with existing processes, but minimizing friction. What the author experienced seems to be a high friction security program, which is the result of a suboptimal cybersecurity program. This is unfortunately the reality in many companies because cybersecurity is implemented as a subset of a high level information security framework without qualified people to connect the high and low level requirements. In the past, security departments were the "firewall gatekepeers", choosing who to allow or deny access. They started to change over time from gatekeepers to support the business but this transition is not complete as we know from experience. The CISO has also has the dillema of having to support the business but will also be held accountable for any hack, which increases the tension on reducing friction vs increasing friction (and increasing control). This is not an easy problem to fix, but I particularly think it's very productive to see posts like this so we can bring this topic to light and find the right balance. And for those interested in learning how to add security to their organizations with minimal friction (security by design, especifically), I'm creating some webinars (free on youtube) here: https://devops.security/webinars.html https://devops.security/webinars.html