> when we obviously know how to write safe software in other spaces in the low level? Think anything space, aviation or automotive. I seriously doubt that thos

> when we obviously know how to write safe software in other spaces in the low level? Think anything space, aviation or automotive. I seriously doubt that those software is near any levels of safe. They are just not attacked as often. > If your remedy to writing bad software is "just put it into a sandbox", then who says that sandbox isn't bad software as well? Chromium has high quality coding, but they still sandbox their own code whenever they can. Security vulnerability results from the limit of humanity, so it cannot be eliminated by just willpower. And to answer your question directly, * Writing a sandbox is easier to get right than many other software. * Even if the sandbox itself is badly written and therefore has vulnerability, it must be combined with the vulnerability of the software it protects in order to achieve any attack. So sandboxing something always increase the difficulty of attackers and is a worthy investment from the viewpoint of security. > The solution I like is to use strictly typed languages, formaly verified compliers, a ton of tests and fuzzing and above all: avoiding unnecessary complexity. The relationship between these and sandboxing is not exclusive. One can and should do both of them.