4 ms·

> If Apple insists, we would consider adding a pager emoji to metadata on all messages sent via Beeper Mini. This would make it easy for Messages App to filter

by mike_d 3y ago

> If Apple insists, we would consider adding a pager emoji to metadata on all messages sent via Beeper Mini. This would make it easy for Messages App to filter out any messages from Beeper Mini users. As an iPhone user I would love for them to do this so I can not communicate with these users. The green/blue bubble gives me an indication of the encryption being used, and presenting a blue bubble while the messages are being MITMed (how Beeper works) is something I want to be aware of.

modeless 3y ago
Beeper Mini does not MITM messages. E2EE is maintained throughout. More so than iMessage actually, which sends all your encryption keys to Apple in the most common configuration (iCloud backup). Where's your concern about that?
- mike_d 3y ago
  That is not true. iMessage content is encrypted in iCloud with keys stored in your keychain only accessible to your devices. When you add a new device to your account it learns the keys from one of your existing devices and requires touch/face ID approval. In an "all devices lost" situation the keychain is backed up to iCloud but encrypted using a key stored in an HSM that requires authentication using things only you know but are never transmitted to Apple using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protoco...
  - modeless 3y ago
    You have been misled. The truth is that the iMessage keys stored in iCloud are accessible to Apple unless you have enabled the non-default Advanced Data Protection (ADP) feature. This is clearly documented by Apple themselves[1]. And even if you do enable it, your messages are still accessible to Apple in the iCloud backups of the people you are messaging, since they likely didn't enable a non-default feature like ADP. Defaults matter! [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651
    - mike_d 3y ago
      From that page: "For additional privacy and security, 14 data categories — including Health and passwords in iCloud Keychain — are end-to-end encrypted. Apple doesn't have the encryption keys for these categories, and we can't help you recover this data if you lose access to your account." The page goes on to list iMessage as always E2E. Other types of data like Calendar are only encrypted in transit and at rest so they can do server side processing. You may also find their legal explanation a bit clearer: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/messages/ https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/messages/ Specifically: "We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption, so there’s no way for Apple to decrypt the content of your conversations when they are in transit between devices. Attachments you send over iMessage (such as photos or videos) are encrypted so that no one but the sender and receiver(s) can access them."
      - modeless 3y ago
        > The page goes on to list iMessage as always E2E It does no such thing. I'm sorry, Apple's wording is precise but quite confusing. The link again is: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 You are likely being misled by Apple's confusing naming. In the "Data categories and encryption" table, "Messages in iCloud" is listed as always end-to-end encrypted, with a footnote. However this is not telling you that all iMessage messages are always stored end-to-end encrypted. In fact "Messages in iCloud" refers to an optional feature of iMessage. The table is telling you that if you enable the "Messages in iCloud" feature, your messages are end-to-end encrypted. But wait, remember that footnote! Follow the footnote reference to find out that in fact, as I said, the end-to-end encryption is broken by iCloud backup unless the optional ADP is enabled. This line of the table is extremely misleading to say the least. But what if you don't enable the "Messages in iCloud" feature? Then your iCloud backup simply includes your messages, which again are not end-to-end encrypted unless you enable the optional ADP. That's covered under the "iCloud Backup (including device and Messages backup)" line in the "Data categories and encryption" table. Note that in this table "In transit & on server" means "not end-to-end". The other page you link states that messages are "encrypted" in iCloud backups; it does not state that they are end-to-end encrypted in iCloud backups, in contrast to the following sentence which specifically calls out end-to-end encryption. The page seems designed to mislead, but it is technically not incorrect because it does not specifically claim end-to-end encryption of iCloud backups. The iCloud documentation I linked, on the other hand, is confusing but definitive and unambiguous if carefully read.
arilotter 3y ago
Beeper Mini does not MITM messages - it's a reverse engineering of how iMessage works, and runs entirely on-device, without putting messages thru Beeper's servers. It talks directly to Apple and pretends to be an iPhone. You're thinking of Beeper Cloud, which does iMessage thru a Mac Mini in the cloud.
- mike_d 3y ago
  Even if it is done on device, the Beeper app is an effective MITM on what should be communications between official clients. It could have security issues, be logging everything to disk, or include a third party analytics SDK that is snarfing data for marketing. Like I said, if they want to flag the communications as being from an unofficial client I am ok with that.
- Shekelphile 3y ago
  > Beeper Mini does not MITM messages - it's a reverse engineering of how iMessage works, and runs entirely on-device, without putting messages thru Beeper's servers. It talks directly to Apple and pretends to be an iPhone. It doesn't matter. It's closed source and not easily audited - they could easily just be doing a naive solution and piping every message back to themselves after it's decrypted by the client.
  - sneak 3y ago
    iMessage is also closed source, and iOS (as documented by Apple) backdoors the encryption in iMessage by including the cross-device “Messages in iCloud” endpoint iMessage sync keys in the non-e2ee iCloud Backup (as documented plainly in Apple’s own HT202303). This means Apple can read the iCloud Backup contents, and Apple has the Messages in iCloud device endpoint keys, and Apple can decrypt the iMessages sent to or from the device in realtime. iMessage is, in practical terms, not really e2ee. It’s not fair to level these sorts of potential/speculative security concerns at Beeper Mini when iMessage’s first-party implementation has way worse problems that are actually documented.
    - Shekelphile 3y ago

by mike_d 3y ago

modeless 3y ago

Beeper Mini does not MITM messages. E2EE is maintained throughout. More so than iMessage actually, which sends all your encryption keys to Apple in the most common configuration (iCloud backup). Where's your concern about that?

mike_d 3y ago
That is not true. iMessage content is encrypted in iCloud with keys stored in your keychain only accessible to your devices. When you add a new device to your account it learns the keys from one of your existing devices and requires touch/face ID approval. In an "all devices lost" situation the keychain is backed up to iCloud but encrypted using a key stored in an HSM that requires authentication using things only you know but are never transmitted to Apple using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protocol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protoco...
- modeless 3y ago
  You have been misled. The truth is that the iMessage keys stored in iCloud are accessible to Apple unless you have enabled the non-default Advanced Data Protection (ADP) feature. This is clearly documented by Apple themselves[1]. And even if you do enable it, your messages are still accessible to Apple in the iCloud backups of the people you are messaging, since they likely didn't enable a non-default feature like ADP. Defaults matter! [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651
  - mike_d 3y ago
    From that page: "For additional privacy and security, 14 data categories — including Health and passwords in iCloud Keychain — are end-to-end encrypted. Apple doesn't have the encryption keys for these categories, and we can't help you recover this data if you lose access to your account." The page goes on to list iMessage as always E2E. Other types of data like Calendar are only encrypted in transit and at rest so they can do server side processing. You may also find their legal explanation a bit clearer: https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/messages/ https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/data/en/messages/ Specifically: "We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption, so there’s no way for Apple to decrypt the content of your conversations when they are in transit between devices. Attachments you send over iMessage (such as photos or videos) are encrypted so that no one but the sender and receiver(s) can access them."
    - modeless 3y ago
      > The page goes on to list iMessage as always E2E It does no such thing. I'm sorry, Apple's wording is precise but quite confusing. The link again is: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651 You are likely being misled by Apple's confusing naming. In the "Data categories and encryption" table, "Messages in iCloud" is listed as always end-to-end encrypted, with a footnote. However this is not telling you that all iMessage messages are always stored end-to-end encrypted. In fact "Messages in iCloud" refers to an optional feature of iMessage. The table is telling you that if you enable the "Messages in iCloud" feature, your messages are end-to-end encrypted. But wait, remember that footnote! Follow the footnote reference to find out that in fact, as I said, the end-to-end encryption is broken by iCloud backup unless the optional ADP is enabled. This line of the table is extremely misleading to say the least. But what if you don't enable the "Messages in iCloud" feature? Then your iCloud backup simply includes your messages, which again are not end-to-end encrypted unless you enable the optional ADP. That's covered under the "iCloud Backup (including device and Messages backup)" line in the "Data categories and encryption" table. Note that in this table "In transit & on server" means "not end-to-end". The other page you link states that messages are "encrypted" in iCloud backups; it does not state that they are end-to-end encrypted in iCloud backups, in contrast to the following sentence which specifically calls out end-to-end encryption. The page seems designed to mislead, but it is technically not incorrect because it does not specifically claim end-to-end encryption of iCloud backups. The iCloud documentation I linked, on the other hand, is confusing but definitive and unambiguous if carefully read.

arilotter 3y ago

Beeper Mini does not MITM messages - it's a reverse engineering of how iMessage works, and runs entirely on-device, without putting messages thru Beeper's servers. It talks directly to Apple and pretends to be an iPhone. You're thinking of Beeper Cloud, which does iMessage thru a Mac Mini in the cloud.

mike_d 3y ago
Even if it is done on device, the Beeper app is an effective MITM on what should be communications between official clients. It could have security issues, be logging everything to disk, or include a third party analytics SDK that is snarfing data for marketing. Like I said, if they want to flag the communications as being from an unofficial client I am ok with that.
Shekelphile 3y ago
> Beeper Mini does not MITM messages - it's a reverse engineering of how iMessage works, and runs entirely on-device, without putting messages thru Beeper's servers. It talks directly to Apple and pretends to be an iPhone. It doesn't matter. It's closed source and not easily audited - they could easily just be doing a naive solution and piping every message back to themselves after it's decrypted by the client.
- sneak 3y ago
  iMessage is also closed source, and iOS (as documented by Apple) backdoors the encryption in iMessage by including the cross-device “Messages in iCloud” endpoint iMessage sync keys in the non-e2ee iCloud Backup (as documented plainly in Apple’s own HT202303). This means Apple can read the iCloud Backup contents, and Apple has the Messages in iCloud device endpoint keys, and Apple can decrypt the iMessages sent to or from the device in realtime. iMessage is, in practical terms, not really e2ee. It’s not fair to level these sorts of potential/speculative security concerns at Beeper Mini when iMessage’s first-party implementation has way worse problems that are actually documented.
  - Shekelphile 3y ago