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The most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. That is perhaps what all of these replacement schemes

The most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. That is perhaps what all of these replacement schemes fail to realize. I really wish "Login with PGP" was a thing and use a subkey for each website, with optional ability to hide the identity of a particular website in my own keychain. You know, sorta like passkeys, but I don't have to have Google/Apple/etc involved and I can actually inspect the magic behind the scenes.

tptacek 3y ago
This is a perfect encapsulation of the gulf between PGP enthusiasts and cryptography engineers, because this "long term online identity" attribute is not only one of PGP's biggest misfeatures just in an implementation and design sense, but also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system.
- rodlette 3y ago
  > also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system. Strong words, but why?
- exabrial 3y ago
  It's a devastating weakness only if you use it in a very certain manner.
woodruffw 3y ago
> The most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. PGP doesn't do this: PGP key has a claimant identity, but actually verifying that claimant is left to the end user. That's why the WoT and strong set were important (before they violently collapsed, revealing that they weren't load bearing after all). Other schemes do realize this, and it's why they make tradeoffs around trusted parties (CAs in the Web PKI performing domain validation, EV for code-signing, etc.).
- jcranmer 3y ago
  > That's why the WoT and strong set were important (before they violently collapsed, revealing that they weren't load bearing after all). I hadn't heard they violently collapsed; do you have any links where I can learn more about this?
  - morelisp 3y ago
    https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/ https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/ https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d695... Also, as someone who went to a few signing parties: the strong set was probably never as strong as some people thought.
ElectricalUnion 3y ago
> "Login with PGP" was a thing and use a subkey for each website How well would such sites handle PGP subkey revocation? What about PGP key revocation? Revocation is very important if your key is compromised. I haven't seen any really maintained pgp keyserver or service in general that didn't directly or indirectly (by user/agent mistake) fail spectacularly since https://evil32.com/ https://evil32.com/ was released and contaminated the 32bit key id space.

tptacek 3y ago

This is a perfect encapsulation of the gulf between PGP enthusiasts and cryptography engineers, because this "long term online identity" attribute is not only one of PGP's biggest misfeatures just in an implementation and design sense, but also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system.

rodlette 3y ago
> also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system. Strong words, but why?
exabrial 3y ago
It's a devastating weakness only if you use it in a very certain manner.

woodruffw 3y ago

> The most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. PGP doesn't do this: PGP key has a claimant identity, but actually verifying that claimant is left to the end user. That's why the WoT and strong set were important (before they violently collapsed, revealing that they weren't load bearing after all). Other schemes do realize this, and it's why they make tradeoffs around trusted parties (CAs in the Web PKI performing domain validation, EV for code-signing, etc.).

jcranmer 3y ago
> That's why the WoT and strong set were important (before they violently collapsed, revealing that they weren't load bearing after all). I hadn't heard they violently collapsed; do you have any links where I can learn more about this?
- morelisp 3y ago
  https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/ https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/ https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d695... Also, as someone who went to a few signing parties: the strong set was probably never as strong as some people thought.

ElectricalUnion 3y ago

> "Login with PGP" was a thing and use a subkey for each website How well would such sites handle PGP subkey revocation? What about PGP key revocation? Revocation is very important if your key is compromised. I haven't seen any really maintained pgp keyserver or service in general that didn't directly or indirectly (by user/agent mistake) fail spectacularly since https://evil32.com/ https://evil32.com/ was released and contaminated the 32bit key id space.