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> Typically, E2EE messaging services rely on local storage and encryption keys to secure encrypted messages. Messenger, however, has a long history of storing p

> Typically, E2EE messaging services rely on local storage and encryption keys to secure encrypted messages. Messenger, however, has a long history of storing people’s messages for them so that they can access them whenever they need without having to store them locally. That’s why we’ve designed a server-based solution where encrypted messages can be stored on Meta’s servers while only being readable using encryption keys under the user’s control. I remember Telegrams founder saying they don't use E2EE because you can't store messages with full E2EE, which obviously BS because matrix does it, and now Facebook too. Now they say there is no "elegant" solution. https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39secret-39 https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-just-make-all-chats-39sec...

pcl 3y ago
It’s also obviously BS since the end-to-end encrypted data in their secret chats passes through their server tier. They could simply save it! The fact that they go to such lengths to convince us that they are doing a favor with their insecure-by-default approach has always rubbed me the wrong way.
- jacooper 3y ago
  But they don't store secret chats, meaning you can't restore them on other devices and that's their supposed problem with E2EE
  - pcl 3y ago
    Yeah -- they created a product offering that supports their weird worldview. It's perfectly legit to store end-to-end encrypted data in its encrypted form and then secure the key material in some manner not visible to the cloud service provider. The Telegram folks have tried their darndest to convince us that this isn't really an option, and so therefore they must go insecure-by-default, even though they also pitch themselves as a bastion of secure messaging. It's always rubbed me the wrong way, since their claims are so obviously false. Which makes me assume they either don't know their domain well enough to be trusted to do any end-to-end encryption properly, or they have some hidden agenda. Neither of those make me want to treat any part of the Telegram chat experience as secure.
supermatt 3y ago
They transmit the messages twice, once to relay to recipients via e2ee (signal), and the other to the storage backend using a different e2ee approach (labyrinth).

pcl 3y ago

It’s also obviously BS since the end-to-end encrypted data in their secret chats passes through their server tier. They could simply save it! The fact that they go to such lengths to convince us that they are doing a favor with their insecure-by-default approach has always rubbed me the wrong way.

jacooper 3y ago
But they don't store secret chats, meaning you can't restore them on other devices and that's their supposed problem with E2EE
- pcl 3y ago
  Yeah -- they created a product offering that supports their weird worldview. It's perfectly legit to store end-to-end encrypted data in its encrypted form and then secure the key material in some manner not visible to the cloud service provider. The Telegram folks have tried their darndest to convince us that this isn't really an option, and so therefore they must go insecure-by-default, even though they also pitch themselves as a bastion of secure messaging. It's always rubbed me the wrong way, since their claims are so obviously false. Which makes me assume they either don't know their domain well enough to be trusted to do any end-to-end encryption properly, or they have some hidden agenda. Neither of those make me want to treat any part of the Telegram chat experience as secure.

supermatt 3y ago

They transmit the messages twice, once to relay to recipients via e2ee (signal), and the other to the storage backend using a different e2ee approach (labyrinth).