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A TPM is a pretty useful thing, but all it can do is to securely store secrets.
by nine_k 3y ago
A TPM is a pretty useful thing, but all it can do is to securely store secrets.
- eimrine 3y agoTo securely store some secrets from the user?
- Avamander 3y agoFrom everyone, if needed.
- nine_k 3y agoYes. E.g. there are cases when it's much better to lose your disk encryption key and the entire disk's contents with it than to let a third party see it. So the disk encryption key may live in a TPM. This is supported by LUKS, for example.
- mschuster91 3y agoStill pointless when the key can be sniffed in cleartext by intercepting the communication between the TPM and the CPU [1]. You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase). The only attack TPM-backed disk encryption prevents is someone imaging the disk. [1] https://blog.scrt.ch/2021/11/15/tpm-sniffing/ https://blog.scrt.ch/2021/11/15/tpm-sniffing/
- chrismorgan 3y ago> The only attack TPM-backed disk encryption prevents is someone imaging the disk. The last section of the article you link says TPM 2.0 may fix the sniffing attack. It’s also worth noting that “someone imaging the disk” was really easy if you got even fairly brief access to the computer, whereas the other attacks that may still be viable involve invasive surgery and specialised knowledge of the hardware in question. (This is my understanding as a developer not particularly informed about boot arrangements, upon reading some relevant material. I could be wrong or have missed some nuance.)
- hulitu 3y ago> The last section of the article you link says TPM 2.0 may fix the sniffing attack English is not my native language but, as far as i know, _may_ expresses uncertainity.
- dan000892 3y ago…or booting from alternate media to retrieve data from the disk in situ (depending on which measurements are used to seal the key in the TPM). “Don’t let perfect be the enemy of good.” Vulnerabilities/limitations should be understood and you have every right to determine that TPM+PIN is the minimum control that addresses threats you’ve modeled and reduces risk to a tolerable level, but TPM-only encryption is not pointless. It reduces risk by increasing required attack complexity without impacting usability. That’s enough for a lot of people.
- devbent 3y ago> You should always combine it with something only known to the user (i.e. a passphrase). The fact this isn't mandatory blows me away. I remember when my work machine first got TPM full disk encryption, a passphrase was needed. A few years later? Meh. Who needs "real" security. Of course I get it is a convenience trade off, it almost always is.
- mschuster91 3y agoIt's especially because Microsoft doesn't want to deal with people who manage to forget their unlock code or those who die without having a break-glass kit deposited at a bank locker, leaving their relatives in quite the mess. I get it, for everyday people TPM-only is enough, but anyone remotely security-minded (or anyone traveling to the US and thus subject to the whims of the CBP) is better served with a good passphrase.
- LoganDark 3y agoYes, exactly. The user is the enemy.
- immibis 3y agoIf a TPM is going to be supported, I want to be the one to install it - whether that means inserting a USB key, or soldering it onto a circuit board. Otherwise, how do I know that it really serves me? A TPM serves the first person who programmed it.