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I think OP means that you enter your password to unencrypt your keyring once at boot or first use and then keep the keys in RAM. So you could not access the dat
by Sebb767 3y ago
I think OP means that you enter your password to unencrypt your keyring once at boot or first use and then keep the keys in RAM. So you could not access the data when you steal the laptop while powered off, making it practically as safe as full-disk encryption.
- AgentME 3y agoThat would be as good as full-disk encryption, but it is possible and useful to do better than that with a TPM. With physical access to a running machine, it is possible to physically extract data from RAM. Law enforcement agencies even have hotplug devices that let them switch a running computer to battery power so they can seize it while keeping it on and do this.
- Sharlin 3y agoPerfect is the enemy of good, however.
- captainmuon 3y agoYes exactly. You'd enter your password once at boot. Then the OS remembers whatever key it needs to access your keychain. The OS becomes the arbitrator to allow who accesses the keychain. Similar to how BitLocker works, I assume. Windows has the keys to decrypt the hard disk, but it requires a valid login + the TPM to actually give it out. I'm not a crypographer so I won't claim to know details, but I think there are schemes to keep secrets safely encrypted in RAM, and only when the OS says OK it uses the TPM do decrypt the secrets. This fails of course when there is a bug in the OS, you can manipulate the CPU directly, or get between the CPU and the TPM, but then we are in "other side of the airtight hatchway" land anyway. I mean it is always a matter of what is my threat scenario, and what level of comfort do I want.