7 ms·

If you trust the hardware then it's entirely possible to tie the release of an encryption key to a fingerprint validated by that hardware. Hardware-backed keys

by mjg59 3y ago

If you trust the hardware then it's entirely possible to tie the release of an encryption key to a fingerprint validated by that hardware. Hardware-backed keys are widely used (the entire WebAuthn ecosystem is predicated upon them being trustworthy), and having that hardware validate a fingerprint rather than merely physical presence is an improvement.

RockRobotRock 3y ago
As far as physical attacks go, we only trust secure elements because they're tiny and very difficult to reverse engineer, right?
- mjg59 3y ago
  In theory you could potentially decap the enclave and read data out of it but you would need extremely high end equipment to do that and it would be obviously destructive so it's not in most people's threat model
- g_p 3y ago
  Partly that, and partly because they were/are built with constrained functionality (do one thing well) that significantly limits the interfaces exposed, and are designed to be secure under the assumption of physical attack (which most things aren't!) Partly because many secure enclave type applications have undergone formal verification and verification through something like CC EAL, which should reduce the likelihood of glaring oversights etc. One final aspect, more for hardware enclaves though, is that they're often designed specifically to resist the kinds of physical attacks people may try - as security products, they've very likely considered power rail glitching and how to reset the enclave if there's a glitch. Similarly, the physical ICs may be produced with physical features to try to prevent successfully decapping the chip, like sensing wires you'll disrupt, and inbuilt EM shielding.
- baybal2 3y ago
  [dead]
westurner 3y ago
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33311523 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33311523 : > [WebAuthn, TPM, U2F/FIDO2, Seahorse,] > tpm-fido: https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido : >> tpm-fido is FIDO token implementation for Linux that protects the token keys by using your system's TPM. tpm-fido uses Linux's uhid facility to emulate a USB HID device so that it is properly detected by browsers. TPM > TPM software libraries: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#TPM_software_libraries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#TPM_so... TPM > Virtualization; virtual TPM devices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#Virtualization https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#Virtua... WebAuthn: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn

by mjg59 3y ago

RockRobotRock 3y ago

As far as physical attacks go, we only trust secure elements because they're tiny and very difficult to reverse engineer, right?

mjg59 3y ago
In theory you could potentially decap the enclave and read data out of it but you would need extremely high end equipment to do that and it would be obviously destructive so it's not in most people's threat model
g_p 3y ago
Partly that, and partly because they were/are built with constrained functionality (do one thing well) that significantly limits the interfaces exposed, and are designed to be secure under the assumption of physical attack (which most things aren't!) Partly because many secure enclave type applications have undergone formal verification and verification through something like CC EAL, which should reduce the likelihood of glaring oversights etc. One final aspect, more for hardware enclaves though, is that they're often designed specifically to resist the kinds of physical attacks people may try - as security products, they've very likely considered power rail glitching and how to reset the enclave if there's a glitch. Similarly, the physical ICs may be produced with physical features to try to prevent successfully decapping the chip, like sensing wires you'll disrupt, and inbuilt EM shielding.
baybal2 3y ago
[dead]

westurner 3y ago

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33311523 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33311523 : > [WebAuthn, TPM, U2F/FIDO2, Seahorse,] > tpm-fido: https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido : >> tpm-fido is FIDO token implementation for Linux that protects the token keys by using your system's TPM. tpm-fido uses Linux's uhid facility to emulate a USB HID device so that it is properly detected by browsers. TPM > TPM software libraries: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#TPM_software_libraries https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#TPM_so... TPM > Virtualization; virtual TPM devices: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#Virtualization https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module#Virtua... WebAuthn: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn