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The section on PIN code fraud really highlights the need to move away from code/password matching to cryptographic verification: > The large number of port and

The section on PIN code fraud really highlights the need to move away from code/password matching to cryptographic verification: > The large number of port and transport personnel who are able to view these reference numbers — in some cases up to 10,000 people in a single shipping company — provides traffickers with many targets. This is equivalent to storing passwords in plaintext. A code that is needed to actually access the goods (i.e. used as a password) should be stored as a cryptographic hash or signature, and then only the right parties can verify that signature, with middle men having no access to it. No, it won't solve all forms of corruption, but it will take thousands of people out of the "bribable" (or worse, "intimidatable", as the article explains) category.

tleilaxu 3y ago
I suspect the existing implementation and it’s downsides are a feature not a bug.
- Nextgrid 3y ago
  The aforementioned example shows nefarious exploitation of the vulnerability, but the same vulnerability is likely also "exploited" day to day by authorized users as a shortcut or workaround against system failures, missing features or bad user experience. For example, in a perfectly-secure system, how hard would it be to delegate access to someone (we assume the reason for delegation is legitimate)? If it's harder than writing down the access code and/or texting them then it's a downgrade. Is there a contingency process to keep working if your (obviously outsourced) SSO provider is down, or your machine is applying updates, or your browser is pestering you to leave feedback and trying to convince you to switch to their search engine before it'll let you access the system's access control page? Etc.