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S2n-TLS – A C99 implementation of the TLS/SSL protocol
- doomrobo 3y agoClarification: this still has dependencies. For example, it requires one of "OpenSSL (versions 1.0.2, 1.1.1 and 3.0.x), LibreSSL, BoringSSL, AWS-LC, and the Apple Common Crypto framework to perform the underlying cryptographic operations"
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- t3rra 3y agoit says "it supports" but not "it requires" in README
- zamadatix 3y agoIt seems to support multiple options but requires you pick at least one of them. https://github.com/aws/s2n-tls/blob/main/docs/BUILD.md#building-with-a-specific-libcrypto https://github.com/aws/s2n-tls/blob/main/docs/BUILD.md#build... AWS-LC is the recommended option of the supported choices, there doesn't seem to be a "built-in" type choice.
- jedisct1 3y agoS2N is great, clean, actively maintained, and even has experimental support for post-quantum key exchange (compatible with BoringSSL and the Zig standard library). Other very nice TLS implementations in C/C++: - Facebook Fizz: https://github.com/facebookincubator/fizz https://github.com/facebookincubator/fizz - PicoTLS: https://github.com/h2o/picotls https://github.com/h2o/picotls
- westurner 3y ago"Continuous formal verification of Amazon s2n" (2018) https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-96142-2_26 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-96142-2_... https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=2686812922904040715&as_sdt=5,43&sciodt=0,43&hl=en https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=2686812922904040715... But formal methods (and TLA+ for distributed computation) don't eliminate side channels.
- quotemstr 3y ago> But formal methods (and TLA+ for distributed computation) don't eliminate side channels. True, but they eliminate whole classes of attack. I'm normally aghast at people writing new code in plain C, but formally verified plain C counts as a whole other and better paradigm to me.
- rewmie 3y ago> I'm normally aghast at people writing new code in plain C, Why?
- PhilipRoman 3y agoThere have been some attempts at formally verifying lack of timing attacks (to the extent allowed by hardware). This is the one I know the most about: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3314221.3314605 https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3314221.3314605 but there are likely others
- folmar 3y agoAlso in around side channel topic for example: E. Prouff and M. Rivain, Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof, EUROCRYPT 2013, LNCS 7881 S. Dziembowski and K. Pietrzak, "Leakage-Resilient Cryptography, 10.1109/FOCS.2008.56.
- westurner 3y agoSide-channel: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack Time complexity > Constant time: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_complexity#Constant_time https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_complexity#Constant_time "Masking against side-channel attacks: A formal security proof" (2013) https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_9 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_... https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=14793554920974372767&as_sdt=5,43&sciodt=0,43&hl=en https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=1479355492097437276... "Leakage-Resilient Cryptography" (2008) https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4690963 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4690963 https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5581902451405085906&as_sdt=5,43&sciodt=0,43&hl=en https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=5581902451405085906...