3 ms·

> Is an MP3 file itself a reproduction of the audio? Or is it merely capable of producing the reproduction? Regardless, when the MP3 file is played using a pro

> Is an MP3 file itself a reproduction of the audio? Or is it merely capable of producing the reproduction? Regardless, when the MP3 file is played using a program following the MP3 standard, the result will be a sound identical or substantially similar to the sound that was encoded into the MP3 file. The purpose of the MP3 standard is to encode audio into a file (which will be called an MP3 file) which when played using a program following the MP3 standard produces a sound similar to the original audio. An AI model is meant to be created by aggregating multiple works, but the purpose of the model is not necessarily to produce something substantially similar to any work in the set. In my framing from the previous paragraph, the purpose of an AI model that produces images is to produce an image that can be opened using JPG/PNG/WEBP/AVIF image viewer, where the new image isn't necessarily supposed to be but can be similar to an existing work. If you were to train an AI model on literally only one work, then you would get something analogous in purpose to an MP3 file, since why would you use the model to produce something nonsimilar to the single work in the training set? Pasting what I wrote in a different comment: My argument is that similarity of new works (including AI model outputs) to actual works (not to non-existing works, existing styles, or theoretical aggregations of multiple works) is a prerequisite to infringement. From an article about the substantial similarity test in the US [1]: > To win a claim of copyright infringement in civil or criminal court, a plaintiff must show he or she owns a valid copyright, the defendant actually copied the work, and the level of copying amounts to misappropriation.[1][3] In order to get an infringing output, the user usually has to include a reference to an existing author or an existing work in the prompt. Sometimes that's not the case (which I've worried about with respect to Copilot), but in order to damn the model as a whole, you would have to establish that in over some percentage of cases the model produces infringing outputs for prompts which don't reference a particular author (whether individual or collective), a particular work, or a style strongly associated with a single or a few authors. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substantial_similarity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substantial_similarity

danaris 3y ago
> but the purpose of the model is not necessarily to produce something substantially similar to any work in the set. I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set.
- hn_acker 3y ago
  > I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set. Before I get into the ability issue, keep in mind that regardless of the future of AI-related law, AI companies already have an incentive to prevent models from producing outputs substantially similar to existing copyrighted works, and the companies already do go out of their way to do the same. And I reiterate that generating something similar to a work in the training set will usually require the user of the model to reference a person (or group), a copyrightable work, or a style strongly associated with a certain person (or group). If the user writes a prompt like that then the user should bears the most responsibility if the result infringes on the copyright to a work in the training set. But more importantly, whether the output infringes doesn't matter until someone publishes it. That someone will be the user who submitted the prompt (and/or the model service provider if the service provider automatically publishes the output by default). Now I'll address the ability issue. > I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set. In the context of regulating AI, I reword `the ability to produce something substantially similar to a work in the training set` (using backticks because you didn't write those exact words) to `the ability to produce an output that infringes on copyright`, and I replace the main subject `model` with `program`. How do you write a law to regulate 1. a program (the program, not the users of the program) with `the ability to produce an output that infringes on copyright` without also regulating 2. a program with the ability to download a copyrighted work from a website that doesn't intend for users to download the work in such a way, while keeping in mind that users of this latter program can distribute the work in ways that infringe on copyright? For example, how do you regulate an image generation model without also regulating youtube-dl? You might point out, in the former case the model produces an infringing work while in the latter case no infringement happens until the user distributes the downloaded work or an infringing derivative. But in the latter case as well, there isn't infringement until the user distributes something relating to the output. Don't confuse my claim with "it's not illegal if no one finds out". If you make a movie adaptation out of someone else's book without permission, you aren't committing copyright infringement unless and until you actually distribute or show your movie adaptation to someone! My general point is that you can't treat the model's mere ability to infringe on copyright as justification to make the model or the model maker (rather than additionally or only a user of the model) liable for infringing outputs. To regulate a particular AI model in a way that preserves freedom of expression, you would have to demonstrate that the model consistently produces infringing outputs X percent of the time when given prompts which don't reference a person/group, a copyrightable work, or a characteristic/style strongly associated with a person/group. I don't know what X percent should be either, but surely 1% is not sufficient.

danaris 3y ago

> but the purpose of the model is not necessarily to produce something substantially similar to any work in the set. I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set.

hn_acker 3y ago
> I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set. Before I get into the ability issue, keep in mind that regardless of the future of AI-related law, AI companies already have an incentive to prevent models from producing outputs substantially similar to existing copyrighted works, and the companies already do go out of their way to do the same. And I reiterate that generating something similar to a work in the training set will usually require the user of the model to reference a person (or group), a copyrightable work, or a style strongly associated with a certain person (or group). If the user writes a prompt like that then the user should bears the most responsibility if the result infringes on the copyright to a work in the training set. But more importantly, whether the output infringes doesn't matter until someone publishes it. That someone will be the user who submitted the prompt (and/or the model service provider if the service provider automatically publishes the output by default). Now I'll address the ability issue. > I think the point is that the purpose here is not relevant if the function includes the ability to do so. Even if the function also includes the ability to produce things that are, in their totality, substantially different from any given work in the training set. In the context of regulating AI, I reword `the ability to produce something substantially similar to a work in the training set` (using backticks because you didn't write those exact words) to `the ability to produce an output that infringes on copyright`, and I replace the main subject `model` with `program`. How do you write a law to regulate 1. a program (the program, not the users of the program) with `the ability to produce an output that infringes on copyright` without also regulating 2. a program with the ability to download a copyrighted work from a website that doesn't intend for users to download the work in such a way, while keeping in mind that users of this latter program can distribute the work in ways that infringe on copyright? For example, how do you regulate an image generation model without also regulating youtube-dl? You might point out, in the former case the model produces an infringing work while in the latter case no infringement happens until the user distributes the downloaded work or an infringing derivative. But in the latter case as well, there isn't infringement until the user distributes something relating to the output. Don't confuse my claim with "it's not illegal if no one finds out". If you make a movie adaptation out of someone else's book without permission, you aren't committing copyright infringement unless and until you actually distribute or show your movie adaptation to someone! My general point is that you can't treat the model's mere ability to infringe on copyright as justification to make the model or the model maker (rather than additionally or only a user of the model) liable for infringing outputs. To regulate a particular AI model in a way that preserves freedom of expression, you would have to demonstrate that the model consistently produces infringing outputs X percent of the time when given prompts which don't reference a person/group, a copyrightable work, or a characteristic/style strongly associated with a person/group. I don't know what X percent should be either, but surely 1% is not sufficient.