Interesting analysis, though I think you should extend it to include the Franco-Prussian, Austria-Prussian wars as well as the Napoleonic wars if you want to un

Interesting analysis, though I think you should extend it to include the Franco-Prussian, Austria-Prussian wars as well as the Napoleonic wars if you want to understand the mindframe that Germany had going into WW1 and WW2. In 1939, Hitler knew he was an underdog. His plan was to quickly switch to taking out France after the fall of Poland (according to himself in an audio recording with Mannerheim), but he was stopped by bad weather. After the fall of France in 1940, his confidence must have been very high, though. He had basically won, and only British stubbornness kept the war going. Had he ended his ambitions there, and just started to blockade the UK, while fortifying the USSR border, he might very well have won. Espeically if he could help Italy gain control of the Middle East. However, it seems like Hitler's real ambitions were in the east all along. He did not hold Russia in high esteem, especially after the collapse in 1917. I would say that the planning leading up to Barbarossa, including the failure to put the economy on a 100% war footing, indicates that he expected a quick and easy campaign. I don't think he realized that it was hopeless until some time 1942. As for Putin, he is obviously not Hitler. But anyone in Europe over the age of 50 (ie all leaders) would remember the end of the cold war, where the USSR was definitely seen as capable of making a massive attack deep into Europe. I think most people expected that Putin would not make a massive attack before first ensuring that the forces were in peak fighting condition. Combined with their numbers, poor readiness and amount of equipment, as well as the sorry state of most European militaries, it was not unreasonable to expect that only the US Army would be able to stop an assault. Only when Russia was thrown back so brutally by Ukraine, one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in Europe, did it become clear how corruption and incompetence had completely corroded the Russian military. If there's a common theme in the above, it is on-paper numerical strength is only a part of the equation when estimating the outcome of a conflict. Leadership, determiniation and popular support are equally important. Those factors caused Russia to collapse in 1917, France in 1940 and Italy in 1942, Palestine in 1948 and two wars each in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Now most Europeans may not have thought it very likely that Russia would attack Nato at any point, but some would argue that a strong defense is better insurance than trusing that Putin would not be stupid and that the US would save Europe again if needed.