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But the judgment of character is central to how our society conceptualizes its response to bad actors, and it informs the space of justifiable responses towards
by hackinthebochs 3y ago
But the judgment of character is central to how our society conceptualizes its response to bad actors, and it informs the space of justifiable responses towards bad actors, that it matters whether the judgment of character is based on fact.
Moral responsibility as we currently conceive of it has been responsible for untold atrocities throughout human history. The problem is the concept has blanket justificatory power. People who are deemed to be moral degenerates by society become authorized targets of heinous behavior with a clear conscience of the perpetrators. Undermining the concept of moral responsibility breaks the connection between a bad actor and cruelty towards them. Taking a quarantine model limits the space of allowable behaviors; heinous reactions no longer have justification. So while the result can be similar in broad strokes between the two systems, the details can end up being very different.
- sickofparadox 3y agoSimply because something has been responsible for bad things does not make it worthy of doing away with motivated reasoning. Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty.
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty. So you do recognize a substantive difference between a justice system based on the concept of moral responsibility and one without. But those of us that are against cruelty are motivated to look more closely at the justifications for it. Hence we get arguments like the one I presented.
- sickofparadox 3y agoA justice system without the concept of moral responsibility is one that has abolished itself. It is impossible for it to exist because justice is a concept that inherently requires morality to function. What you suggest is, again, a reconstruction of a justice system pretending it does not make moral judgement. "You were not in control of your actions, yet we have decided to lock you in a cell - for the greater good, of course".
- s1artibartfast 3y agothe choice of a "quarantine model" vs cruelty is orthogonal to the question of free-will vs determinism. A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice. The difference is not made by understanding of choice, but the values held by the one with power.
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice. I don't think this can be supported. There is no contradiction in destroying an entity that gets in your way, but presumably there is more at stake when it comes to humans engaging with humans. We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community. But given a lack of free will/moral responsibility, the interests of the bad actor cannot be completely disregarded. For example, their interest in their life isn't forfeited simply for being a nuisance.
- s1artibartfast 3y ago>We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community This belief is the one that is impendent of free will. If you believe in minimizing suffering before refuting free will, you will believe it after. If you dont before, you wont after. The question is orthogonal. The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky. I havent seen him or anyone else explain why the existence of free will provides rational support for inflicting suffering. Yet, people somehow claim that refuting free will refutes inflicting unnecessary suffering.
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>The whole premise that free will is a justification for inflicting suffering seems like a strawman from Sapolsky. It's definitely not something Sapolsky came up with. The connection between free will and moral responsibility has been a central focus of the debate about free will since philosophers took up the issue[1]. One then only needs to recognize the connection between moral responsibility, moral indignation, and cruelty towards bad actors to see the relationship go through. You can certainly question whether free will provides genuine rational support for cruelty, but it doesn't take much to notice that people have historically used free will as a rationalization for cruelty, whether legitimately or not. I do agree that its unlikely any one person will be moved to change their behavior after accepting a lack of free will/moral responsibility. But we are in a much better position to construct society in a way that takes this knowledge into account, for example by greatly improving prison conditions, having a stronger focus on the conditions that give rise to criminal behavior, and so on. [1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeWillMoraResp https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeWillMoraRes...