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What's nonsensical about it? Determining that we can't rationally hold people responsible doesn't mean that society is powerless to defend itself against bad ac
by hackinthebochs 3y ago
What's nonsensical about it? Determining that we can't rationally hold people responsible doesn't mean that society is powerless to defend itself against bad actors. What it does is undermines the justification for moral indignation and our retributive tendencies. If someone contracted a contagious illness, we would quarantine them despite the fact that they're not responsible for their illness. There's no contradiction in defensive behavior and recognizing a lack of moral responsibility.
- sickofparadox 3y agoI am reminded of the phrase "The easiest way to prove a nihilist as a hypocrite is to point a shotgun at his head." You have reconstructed moral responsibility in no responsibility land, possibly only removing the judgement of character that comes with "defensive behavior".
- graphe 3y agoMoral responsibility isn't the same as responsibility. Leprosy isn't a moral failing, although people still will discriminate against lepers.
- RcouF1uZ4gsC 3y agoIs discrimination against lepers a moral failing?
- hackinthebochs 3y agoBut the judgment of character is central to how our society conceptualizes its response to bad actors, and it informs the space of justifiable responses towards bad actors, that it matters whether the judgment of character is based on fact. Moral responsibility as we currently conceive of it has been responsible for untold atrocities throughout human history. The problem is the concept has blanket justificatory power. People who are deemed to be moral degenerates by society become authorized targets of heinous behavior with a clear conscience of the perpetrators. Undermining the concept of moral responsibility breaks the connection between a bad actor and cruelty towards them. Taking a quarantine model limits the space of allowable behaviors; heinous reactions no longer have justification. So while the result can be similar in broad strokes between the two systems, the details can end up being very different.
- sickofparadox 3y agoSimply because something has been responsible for bad things does not make it worthy of doing away with motivated reasoning. Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty.
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>Also, sometimes bad actors deserve cruelty. So you do recognize a substantive difference between a justice system based on the concept of moral responsibility and one without. But those of us that are against cruelty are motivated to look more closely at the justifications for it. Hence we get arguments like the one I presented.
- sickofparadox 3y agoA justice system without the concept of moral responsibility is one that has abolished itself. It is impossible for it to exist because justice is a concept that inherently requires morality to function. What you suggest is, again, a reconstruction of a justice system pretending it does not make moral judgement. "You were not in control of your actions, yet we have decided to lock you in a cell - for the greater good, of course".
- s1artibartfast 3y agothe choice of a "quarantine model" vs cruelty is orthogonal to the question of free-will vs determinism. A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice. The difference is not made by understanding of choice, but the values held by the one with power.
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>A cruel extermination model is just as rational of a response to bad actors with no choice. I don't think this can be supported. There is no contradiction in destroying an entity that gets in your way, but presumably there is more at stake when it comes to humans engaging with humans. We recognize that other humans, at least those in good standing in our social community, have interests that should not be interfered with without strong justification, enough to overcome their rights as members of the community. But given a lack of free will/moral responsibility, the interests of the bad actor cannot be completely disregarded. For example, their interest in their life isn't forfeited simply for being a nuisance.
- s1artibartfast 3y agoI dont think it avoids the moral judgement, it just obfuscates it, or replaces it with a comparable concept. You dont need free will to rationally have disgust, indignation, and retribution. You can rationally punish someone who contracted a contagious illness. All you need for rationale is switching from the idea that someone makes bad choices to the idea that someone is a bad machine.
- hackinthebochs 3y agoWould you "punish" your computer for crashing? Seems absurd. Presumably we don't want to engage in absurdities and irrational behavior. We want to do what is "right", for various conceptions of right. So getting clear on whether we have moral responsibility is important to getting things right.
- s1artibartfast 3y agoWhy do we punish anything? I might punish my computer by replacing it because it crashes. I might punish it with a hammer after because it is cathartic. None of that relies on the computer having choice in the matter. Free will is independent of moral responsibility. you can hold someone guilty of "being bad" just as easily as making "bad choices"
- hackinthebochs 3y ago>None of that relies on the computer having choice in the matter. Most normally functioning people would not feel the need to punish a tool for being a bad tool. Some may find catharsis in damaging some object that has frustrated them, but usually they later recognize the absurdity of their outburst. The point is that we all generally recognize that there are legitimate and illegitimate targets for "punishment". The question is whether people are actually legitimate targets for punishment despite our intuitions on the matter. >you can hold someone guilty of "being bad" just as easily as making "bad choices" Sure you can; nothing is going to stop you from smashing your PC to bits next time it crashes. The issue is whether it is the all things considered correct choice.