The book doesn't shy away from describing the collaboration between Microsoft and IBM. Also, the book depicts Microsoft knowingly screwing over IBM in their col

The book doesn't shy away from describing the collaboration between Microsoft and IBM. Also, the book depicts Microsoft knowingly screwing over IBM in their collaboration. So Gates sided with Maritz. NT would assume the Windows “personality,” by assuming those of its attributes that were visible to the customer. NT also would be redesigned to run applications written specifically for Windows. But Gates added a wrinkle to his position. Given the depth of IBM’s attachment to OS/2, Gates reasoned, abandoning the program altogether would only trigger a nasty split with IBM. Why not maintain a pretense of cooperation by convincing IBM of the merits of an operating system that hosted both Windows and OS/2? NT could be designed to do this, Gates reasoned. If IBM accepted this, Microsoft could continue to describe Cutler’s program as “NT OS/2.” Even though it contradicted his rhetoric about the need for a single software standard, Gates was prepared to tell IBM: “There’s no reason to think two [program personalities] can’t be of equal importance” to customers. This was a bold stroke. By denying reality, Gates’s tactic would freeze IBM long enough for Microsoft to install Windows as the standard for computing. Gates would peddle this apparent compromise to IBM and rival software makers, while Maritz and Cutler’s team pursued the real objective internally. ... Cutler asked about Ballmer’s promise that NT would still sport an OS/2 personality. Not to worry, Ballmer assured him, someone else could take care of that. Indeed, OS/2 was now so unimportant to Microsoft that Ballmer had assigned a tiny team in Israel to create an OS/2 variant of NT. The Microsofties hated OS/2 so much they couldn’t even bear to have someone working on it in the same continent.