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> the strong WWI and WWII lessons Those are that an economically smaller power that achieves surprise and has a well honed military may do a lot of damage befo

> the strong WWI and WWII lessons Those are that an economically smaller power that achieves surprise and has a well honed military may do a lot of damage before finally defeated. The fact that Russia still has a lot of nukes _could_ tempt them to take the Baltic countries and some more border territories and demand a cease fire along the new border. I've not been one of those who used to think that there was any realistic chance of this, though, at least until a full incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Unless something like brain cancer made Putin completely crazy, that is.

southernplaces7 3y ago
Yes but Germany was run by a partly insane gambler whose entire personal purpose in life was welded to going for broke on his big military ambition. One assumes with plenty of good reasons across 23 years of his rule that modern Putin doesn't have the same mentality, that he's generally more the calculating Stalin type at worst. In WWI Germany made a similar mistake to what it did in WWII but the dynamics of the situation made its Imperial leadership "feel obligated" to war, bolstered by them really thinking victory was reasonably possible, as terribly wrong as they were. Hitler and his coterie on the other hand knew at the outset that victory was extremely unlikely (they after all had the previous experience of WWI hindsight to look to, which the Kaiser and his general staff did not), but the Nazi leader didn't care anyhow. He was willing to bet everything on the small window of possibility that did favor spectacular victory. The overall lesson of both wars still remains that barring extreme luck which ends a war victoriously for the smaller aggressor after only a brief series of strategic surprise attacks (you're right in what you say about a smaller power achieving much through surprise), the eventual result of any prolonged war between dramatically imbalanced economic powers will be the crushing defeat of the weaker power IF its the aggressor. Once both Germany and Japan failed in their strategic surprise gambits, they were absolutely doomed. Russia would be too if it did the same. Now even more so because it already spoiled any possible surprise against NATO by attacking Ukraine, and partly failing even at that. I mention the requisite of the weaker power being the aggressor because in cases where it's simply defending itself, victory against a much bigger power is possible even in a prolonged war if the smaller country is determined enough despite horrific costs to keep bleeding its large enemy into making further fighting not worthwhile. Afghanistan and Vietnam being great examples.
- trashtester 3y ago
  Interesting analysis, though I think you should extend it to include the Franco-Prussian, Austria-Prussian wars as well as the Napoleonic wars if you want to understand the mindframe that Germany had going into WW1 and WW2. In 1939, Hitler knew he was an underdog. His plan was to quickly switch to taking out France after the fall of Poland (according to himself in an audio recording with Mannerheim), but he was stopped by bad weather. After the fall of France in 1940, his confidence must have been very high, though. He had basically won, and only British stubbornness kept the war going. Had he ended his ambitions there, and just started to blockade the UK, while fortifying the USSR border, he might very well have won. Espeically if he could help Italy gain control of the Middle East. However, it seems like Hitler's real ambitions were in the east all along. He did not hold Russia in high esteem, especially after the collapse in 1917. I would say that the planning leading up to Barbarossa, including the failure to put the economy on a 100% war footing, indicates that he expected a quick and easy campaign. I don't think he realized that it was hopeless until some time 1942. As for Putin, he is obviously not Hitler. But anyone in Europe over the age of 50 (ie all leaders) would remember the end of the cold war, where the USSR was definitely seen as capable of making a massive attack deep into Europe. I think most people expected that Putin would not make a massive attack before first ensuring that the forces were in peak fighting condition. Combined with their numbers, poor readiness and amount of equipment, as well as the sorry state of most European militaries, it was not unreasonable to expect that only the US Army would be able to stop an assault. Only when Russia was thrown back so brutally by Ukraine, one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in Europe, did it become clear how corruption and incompetence had completely corroded the Russian military. If there's a common theme in the above, it is on-paper numerical strength is only a part of the equation when estimating the outcome of a conflict. Leadership, determiniation and popular support are equally important. Those factors caused Russia to collapse in 1917, France in 1940 and Italy in 1942, Palestine in 1948 and two wars each in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Now most Europeans may not have thought it very likely that Russia would attack Nato at any point, but some would argue that a strong defense is better insurance than trusing that Putin would not be stupid and that the US would save Europe again if needed.

southernplaces7 3y ago

Yes but Germany was run by a partly insane gambler whose entire personal purpose in life was welded to going for broke on his big military ambition. One assumes with plenty of good reasons across 23 years of his rule that modern Putin doesn't have the same mentality, that he's generally more the calculating Stalin type at worst. In WWI Germany made a similar mistake to what it did in WWII but the dynamics of the situation made its Imperial leadership "feel obligated" to war, bolstered by them really thinking victory was reasonably possible, as terribly wrong as they were. Hitler and his coterie on the other hand knew at the outset that victory was extremely unlikely (they after all had the previous experience of WWI hindsight to look to, which the Kaiser and his general staff did not), but the Nazi leader didn't care anyhow. He was willing to bet everything on the small window of possibility that did favor spectacular victory. The overall lesson of both wars still remains that barring extreme luck which ends a war victoriously for the smaller aggressor after only a brief series of strategic surprise attacks (you're right in what you say about a smaller power achieving much through surprise), the eventual result of any prolonged war between dramatically imbalanced economic powers will be the crushing defeat of the weaker power IF its the aggressor. Once both Germany and Japan failed in their strategic surprise gambits, they were absolutely doomed. Russia would be too if it did the same. Now even more so because it already spoiled any possible surprise against NATO by attacking Ukraine, and partly failing even at that. I mention the requisite of the weaker power being the aggressor because in cases where it's simply defending itself, victory against a much bigger power is possible even in a prolonged war if the smaller country is determined enough despite horrific costs to keep bleeding its large enemy into making further fighting not worthwhile. Afghanistan and Vietnam being great examples.

trashtester 3y ago
Interesting analysis, though I think you should extend it to include the Franco-Prussian, Austria-Prussian wars as well as the Napoleonic wars if you want to understand the mindframe that Germany had going into WW1 and WW2. In 1939, Hitler knew he was an underdog. His plan was to quickly switch to taking out France after the fall of Poland (according to himself in an audio recording with Mannerheim), but he was stopped by bad weather. After the fall of France in 1940, his confidence must have been very high, though. He had basically won, and only British stubbornness kept the war going. Had he ended his ambitions there, and just started to blockade the UK, while fortifying the USSR border, he might very well have won. Espeically if he could help Italy gain control of the Middle East. However, it seems like Hitler's real ambitions were in the east all along. He did not hold Russia in high esteem, especially after the collapse in 1917. I would say that the planning leading up to Barbarossa, including the failure to put the economy on a 100% war footing, indicates that he expected a quick and easy campaign. I don't think he realized that it was hopeless until some time 1942. As for Putin, he is obviously not Hitler. But anyone in Europe over the age of 50 (ie all leaders) would remember the end of the cold war, where the USSR was definitely seen as capable of making a massive attack deep into Europe. I think most people expected that Putin would not make a massive attack before first ensuring that the forces were in peak fighting condition. Combined with their numbers, poor readiness and amount of equipment, as well as the sorry state of most European militaries, it was not unreasonable to expect that only the US Army would be able to stop an assault. Only when Russia was thrown back so brutally by Ukraine, one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in Europe, did it become clear how corruption and incompetence had completely corroded the Russian military. If there's a common theme in the above, it is on-paper numerical strength is only a part of the equation when estimating the outcome of a conflict. Leadership, determiniation and popular support are equally important. Those factors caused Russia to collapse in 1917, France in 1940 and Italy in 1942, Palestine in 1948 and two wars each in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Now most Europeans may not have thought it very likely that Russia would attack Nato at any point, but some would argue that a strong defense is better insurance than trusing that Putin would not be stupid and that the US would save Europe again if needed.