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Nice, but it is planned to be operational in next 10 years. While we(NATO) need a useful deterrent in place in Europe in next ~6 years tops. If people of EU tru

Nice, but it is planned to be operational in next 10 years. While we(NATO) need a useful deterrent in place in Europe in next ~6 years tops. If people of EU truly believe people have rights not to be enslaved, killed, have a right to govern themselves in a democratic way, more money and effort has to be invested in mass manufacturing of currently and previously available weapons. Such as artillery shells (preferably smart, with rocket assist, but dumb too). Also systems using drones and manpads (the latter are being manufactured in Poland for example, but in two orders of magnitude too low a volume).

3seashells 3y ago
The Finland border affair has shown that all the effort put into ending democracy by furthering totalitarian parties can not be deterred. Why build rockets if they hit and defeat you anyway.
yourusername 3y ago
I agree we need more investment in defense but where does the 6 year timeline come from? What happens in 6 years?
networkchad 3y ago
[dead]
trashtester 3y ago
There is no legitimate threat from Russia to Nato within the next 6 years. Russia is struggling against a technological 3rd rate power such as Ukraine. If NATO mobilized the economy for wartime production, it could quickly produce enough hardware to overwhelm Russia. And Russia's economy would have no response. China, though, is a completely different matter. Their industrial and technological base is an order of magnitude larger than Russia's.
- southernplaces7 3y ago
  The curious thing about what you say is that until a few months into the Ukraine war, it was far from commonly accepted knowledge. I can't count how many analysis articles and opinion pieces from before this war spoke frequently of Russia's possible ability to attack the Nato Alliance heavily. Some people, remembering the strong WWI and WWII lessons that economics eventually always decides victory, looked at the Russian economy compared to the combined economies of the NATO alliance countries and quickly saw that a Russian invasion of anything bigger than a small nearby country (think Georgia; not even Ukraine fits the bill as small enough) would be an eventual disaster for Russia itself, but its projected image of new fighting might under Putin's supposed military modernization held just enough media sway to make this easily forgettable.
  - trashtester 3y ago
    > the strong WWI and WWII lessons Those are that an economically smaller power that achieves surprise and has a well honed military may do a lot of damage before finally defeated. The fact that Russia still has a lot of nukes _could_ tempt them to take the Baltic countries and some more border territories and demand a cease fire along the new border. I've not been one of those who used to think that there was any realistic chance of this, though, at least until a full incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Unless something like brain cancer made Putin completely crazy, that is.
    - southernplaces7 3y ago
      Yes but Germany was run by a partly insane gambler whose entire personal purpose in life was welded to going for broke on his big military ambition. One assumes with plenty of good reasons across 23 years of his rule that modern Putin doesn't have the same mentality, that he's generally more the calculating Stalin type at worst. In WWI Germany made a similar mistake to what it did in WWII but the dynamics of the situation made its Imperial leadership "feel obligated" to war, bolstered by them really thinking victory was reasonably possible, as terribly wrong as they were. Hitler and his coterie on the other hand knew at the outset that victory was extremely unlikely (they after all had the previous experience of WWI hindsight to look to, which the Kaiser and his general staff did not), but the Nazi leader didn't care anyhow. He was willing to bet everything on the small window of possibility that did favor spectacular victory. The overall lesson of both wars still remains that barring extreme luck which ends a war victoriously for the smaller aggressor after only a brief series of strategic surprise attacks (you're right in what you say about a smaller power achieving much through surprise), the eventual result of any prolonged war between dramatically imbalanced economic powers will be the crushing defeat of the weaker power IF its the aggressor. Once both Germany and Japan failed in their strategic surprise gambits, they were absolutely doomed. Russia would be too if it did the same. Now even more so because it already spoiled any possible surprise against NATO by attacking Ukraine, and partly failing even at that. I mention the requisite of the weaker power being the aggressor because in cases where it's simply defending itself, victory against a much bigger power is possible even in a prolonged war if the smaller country is determined enough despite horrific costs to keep bleeding its large enemy into making further fighting not worthwhile. Afghanistan and Vietnam being great examples.
- flagrant_taco 3y ago
  The GP didn't specifically call out Russia, seems reasonable that they may very well have had Russia + allies in mind. It is worth noting that many countries have poured money, weapons, training, and in all likelihood special forces combat troops into Ukraine. Ukraine clearly has the numbers and devotion to fight a long, deadly fight that has in some areas devolved into WWI-era trench warfare. It isn't as simple as the Russians struggling with a 3rd rate power, however that is measured. Ukraine has the numbers and the will, allies provided resources/training/intel, and Ukraine had the tactical advantage of protecting their homeland rather than being the invading force.
  - riku_iki 3y ago
    > Ukraine clearly has the numbers and devotion to fight a long, deadly fight that has in some areas devolved into WWI-era trench warfare. I think this was the reason of majority of their success: citizens mobilized and dug into the ground in the lines of defense, which stopped invasion.
- T-A 3y ago
  > There is no legitimate threat from Russia to Nato within the next 6 years Roark66 said "next ~6 years tops", so you two do not really disagree; the question is what comes after those six years. The number is presumably taken from this recent publication: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/preventing-next-war https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/preventing-next-wa...
  - trashtester 3y ago
    That publication, presumably intended for German decision makers, state that it would take Russia at least 6-10 years after concluding the war in Ukraine before they could rebuild to a point where they would be any threat to Nato. Furthermore, if the war ends with either a stalemate or a Russian loss, there will still be an Ukraine between them and most Nato countries (unless Ukraine joins Nato). While I definitely agree with the article that it makes sense for Germany increase their capabilities (not only by increasing budgets, but also by making sure the money is used to expand abilities, not just subsidise various industries or communities), there is no way Russia could become a serious threat to a united Nato even given 6-10 years of buildup. Also, countering Russia over a time over the next 10-15 years almost certainly will only require building up stockpiles of current generation hardware, combined with ensuring that enough personell is available. To do their fair share, Germany could aim at matching Polish strength, for instance. The article in question here is about the next generation of hardware, a "superweapon" by today's standards. If it arrives in 10 years, then that's pretty good timing. Let's say the War in Ukraine lasts to 2026, and Russa starts intensive rearmament (or just let the wartime production lines continue to run), then moderate Nato buildup would be enough until the 2030's. From there on, error bars grow larger. It is possible that Russia will collapse under corruption and demographic collapse, but it is also possible that they will be able to turn their economy around (possibly through heavy automation) while continuing to develop their military, especially if they maintain close relations to China. In such a world (that I think of as low probability), it's good to have new generations of weapons available. Meanwhile, China is in the middle of a collossal force buildup right now. I'm sure the "German Council for Foreign Relations" doesn't focus very much on that. But for Nato as a whole, China is a much, much more urgent danger within the next 10 years, and probably for at least 30 years. The only way I can see this change, would be if AI could be used to convert Russia's huge reserves of energy and raw materials into military strength. But countering that that would require a completely different type of planning, anyway.
- baybal2 3y ago
  [dead]

3seashells 3y ago

The Finland border affair has shown that all the effort put into ending democracy by furthering totalitarian parties can not be deterred. Why build rockets if they hit and defeat you anyway.

yourusername 3y ago

I agree we need more investment in defense but where does the 6 year timeline come from? What happens in 6 years?

networkchad 3y ago

[dead]

trashtester 3y ago

There is no legitimate threat from Russia to Nato within the next 6 years. Russia is struggling against a technological 3rd rate power such as Ukraine. If NATO mobilized the economy for wartime production, it could quickly produce enough hardware to overwhelm Russia. And Russia's economy would have no response. China, though, is a completely different matter. Their industrial and technological base is an order of magnitude larger than Russia's.

southernplaces7 3y ago
The curious thing about what you say is that until a few months into the Ukraine war, it was far from commonly accepted knowledge. I can't count how many analysis articles and opinion pieces from before this war spoke frequently of Russia's possible ability to attack the Nato Alliance heavily. Some people, remembering the strong WWI and WWII lessons that economics eventually always decides victory, looked at the Russian economy compared to the combined economies of the NATO alliance countries and quickly saw that a Russian invasion of anything bigger than a small nearby country (think Georgia; not even Ukraine fits the bill as small enough) would be an eventual disaster for Russia itself, but its projected image of new fighting might under Putin's supposed military modernization held just enough media sway to make this easily forgettable.
- trashtester 3y ago
  > the strong WWI and WWII lessons Those are that an economically smaller power that achieves surprise and has a well honed military may do a lot of damage before finally defeated. The fact that Russia still has a lot of nukes _could_ tempt them to take the Baltic countries and some more border territories and demand a cease fire along the new border. I've not been one of those who used to think that there was any realistic chance of this, though, at least until a full incorporation of Belarus and Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Unless something like brain cancer made Putin completely crazy, that is.
  - southernplaces7 3y ago
    Yes but Germany was run by a partly insane gambler whose entire personal purpose in life was welded to going for broke on his big military ambition. One assumes with plenty of good reasons across 23 years of his rule that modern Putin doesn't have the same mentality, that he's generally more the calculating Stalin type at worst. In WWI Germany made a similar mistake to what it did in WWII but the dynamics of the situation made its Imperial leadership "feel obligated" to war, bolstered by them really thinking victory was reasonably possible, as terribly wrong as they were. Hitler and his coterie on the other hand knew at the outset that victory was extremely unlikely (they after all had the previous experience of WWI hindsight to look to, which the Kaiser and his general staff did not), but the Nazi leader didn't care anyhow. He was willing to bet everything on the small window of possibility that did favor spectacular victory. The overall lesson of both wars still remains that barring extreme luck which ends a war victoriously for the smaller aggressor after only a brief series of strategic surprise attacks (you're right in what you say about a smaller power achieving much through surprise), the eventual result of any prolonged war between dramatically imbalanced economic powers will be the crushing defeat of the weaker power IF its the aggressor. Once both Germany and Japan failed in their strategic surprise gambits, they were absolutely doomed. Russia would be too if it did the same. Now even more so because it already spoiled any possible surprise against NATO by attacking Ukraine, and partly failing even at that. I mention the requisite of the weaker power being the aggressor because in cases where it's simply defending itself, victory against a much bigger power is possible even in a prolonged war if the smaller country is determined enough despite horrific costs to keep bleeding its large enemy into making further fighting not worthwhile. Afghanistan and Vietnam being great examples.
flagrant_taco 3y ago
The GP didn't specifically call out Russia, seems reasonable that they may very well have had Russia + allies in mind. It is worth noting that many countries have poured money, weapons, training, and in all likelihood special forces combat troops into Ukraine. Ukraine clearly has the numbers and devotion to fight a long, deadly fight that has in some areas devolved into WWI-era trench warfare. It isn't as simple as the Russians struggling with a 3rd rate power, however that is measured. Ukraine has the numbers and the will, allies provided resources/training/intel, and Ukraine had the tactical advantage of protecting their homeland rather than being the invading force.
- riku_iki 3y ago
  > Ukraine clearly has the numbers and devotion to fight a long, deadly fight that has in some areas devolved into WWI-era trench warfare. I think this was the reason of majority of their success: citizens mobilized and dug into the ground in the lines of defense, which stopped invasion.
T-A 3y ago
> There is no legitimate threat from Russia to Nato within the next 6 years Roark66 said "next ~6 years tops", so you two do not really disagree; the question is what comes after those six years. The number is presumably taken from this recent publication: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/preventing-next-war https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/preventing-next-wa...
- trashtester 3y ago
  That publication, presumably intended for German decision makers, state that it would take Russia at least 6-10 years after concluding the war in Ukraine before they could rebuild to a point where they would be any threat to Nato. Furthermore, if the war ends with either a stalemate or a Russian loss, there will still be an Ukraine between them and most Nato countries (unless Ukraine joins Nato). While I definitely agree with the article that it makes sense for Germany increase their capabilities (not only by increasing budgets, but also by making sure the money is used to expand abilities, not just subsidise various industries or communities), there is no way Russia could become a serious threat to a united Nato even given 6-10 years of buildup. Also, countering Russia over a time over the next 10-15 years almost certainly will only require building up stockpiles of current generation hardware, combined with ensuring that enough personell is available. To do their fair share, Germany could aim at matching Polish strength, for instance. The article in question here is about the next generation of hardware, a "superweapon" by today's standards. If it arrives in 10 years, then that's pretty good timing. Let's say the War in Ukraine lasts to 2026, and Russa starts intensive rearmament (or just let the wartime production lines continue to run), then moderate Nato buildup would be enough until the 2030's. From there on, error bars grow larger. It is possible that Russia will collapse under corruption and demographic collapse, but it is also possible that they will be able to turn their economy around (possibly through heavy automation) while continuing to develop their military, especially if they maintain close relations to China. In such a world (that I think of as low probability), it's good to have new generations of weapons available. Meanwhile, China is in the middle of a collossal force buildup right now. I'm sure the "German Council for Foreign Relations" doesn't focus very much on that. But for Nato as a whole, China is a much, much more urgent danger within the next 10 years, and probably for at least 30 years. The only way I can see this change, would be if AI could be used to convert Russia's huge reserves of energy and raw materials into military strength. But countering that that would require a completely different type of planning, anyway.
baybal2 3y ago
[dead]