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Using a rock as an example makes sense given the post I replied to. The argument that we lack a "mechanistic model of qualia" has nothing to do with behavior.
by slibhb 3y ago
Using a rock as an example makes sense given the post I replied to. The argument that we lack a "mechanistic model of qualia" has nothing to do with behavior.
That aside, we should be close to certain that LLMs don't have internal lives. That computer programs can mimic human behavior in some contexts is a tremendous discovery but it's no reason to assume an internal life. Conversely, many animals can't mimic human behavior but clearly have internal lives.
The capacity for an internal life evolved over a billion odd years. It has something to do with our bodies and if we want to understand it, we should focus on biology and neuroscience. A machine with an internal life would need hardware designed or evolved for that purpose and modern computers lack that.
- naasking 3y agoYou cannot simultaneously believe that qualia evolved while also asserting that qualia has nothing to do with behaviour. In any case, the behaviour I'm referring to is clearly a proxy for complex change. A rock does not undergo complex changes, so unless you're a panpsychist, it's a pretty straightforward deduction that a rock doesn't have internal life. > but it's no reason to assume an internal life. I'm not asserting they have an internal life, the person I responded to was saying they have no internal life and I said they cannot rigorously justify such a claim.
- slibhb 3y agoI didn't say that internal life has nothing to do with behavior. I said you can't infer internal life from behavior. > I'm not asserting they have an internal life, the person I responded to was saying they have no internal life and I said they cannot rigorously justify such a claim. The only claim that I can "rigorously justify" concerning internal lives is that I have one. And the proof is subjective. Clearly this is not a discussion that admits the kind of rigor you're demanding... We have good reason to believe that people and animals have internal lives whereas rocks and computers don't. That we can't be certain of this isn't a reason to believe the opposite. If your goal here is to insist that all statements about internal lives (other than "I have an internal life") can't be "rigorously justified," fine, I agree.
- naasking 3y ago> I said you can't infer internal life from behavior. Behaviour can't tell you there isn't internal life, but complex behaviour sure is a big red flag that there might be internal life there. > We have good reason to believe that people and animals have internal lives whereas rocks and computers don't. Rocks yes, computer programs no we don't, that's the point. There is no reason to suppose an information processing system that can converse intelligently doesn't have some kind of internal experience, and you have presented not a single argument suggesting that we can draw such a conclusion. I presented a simple deduction for rocks, what is the corresponding deduction for computer programs?
- slibhb 3y ago> Behaviour can't tell you there isn't internal life, but complex behaviour sure is a big red flag that there might be internal life there. I agree, behavior is evidence, but there are good reasons to suppose that, despite their behavior, computers lack internal lives. To try to make my argument more clearly: I know I have an internal life (due to subjective evidence). My internal life is related to the structure of my body in an unknown way. I'm willing to grant that other humans and similar, evolved organisms also have internal lives because they are the same kind of evolved thing as me. If someone wants to argue that a designed, thoroughly understood object (like a computer) has an internal life, they need to explain how the structure of the object gives rise to an internal life. Behavior isn't enough.
- naasking 3y ago> My internal life is related to the structure of my body in an unknown way That's right, an unknown way. So we know the internal structures of computers and their programs, but we don't know the internal structure of humans and how that leads to sentience, but somehow this translates into having good reasons for thinking the relationships in computers are not isomorphic to or meaningfully related to the unknown structures that lead to human sentience? Don't you see the big blank there? This just does not follow and is exactly the first point I made in this thread. All I've been pointing out this is that people making strong statements about LLMs lacking sentience are leaping to conclusions.