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I think I want to clarify this a bit, like: if you're building something like Noise, KCI matters a lot, because you're defining a generalized secure transport i
by tptacek 3y ago
I think I want to clarify this a bit, like: if you're building something like Noise, KCI matters a lot, because you're defining a generalized secure transport intended to be widely re-used, so you want to ratchet up the security promises you can make as far as they can reasonably go --- and even then there are Noise patterns that don't maximally address things like KCI?
But most people most of the time aren't building and shouldn't build things like Noise. I'm the weirdo who thinks people like Trevor should build Noise, and generally other people shouldn't, because there's a whole lot of engineering context that you need to have to make sound decisions. It's one of several reasons I wouldn't feel qualified designing something like that.
If you're _not_ designing a generalized reusable system --- and if you can get away with not doing that, you should, because reusability in cryptography designs ratchets up difficulty, which is the last thing you want with cryptography engineering --- then it is simply not the case that every design should be assiduously avoiding key commitment weaknesses.