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> but the theory is that in order to be able to detect fraud you will have to have some fraud! That fails to argue that having any fraud is beneficial; if you
by thaumasiotes 3y ago
> but the theory is that in order to be able to detect fraud you will have to have some fraud!
That fails to argue that having any fraud is beneficial; if you have no fraud, there is no value in being able to detect fraud.
- jacquesm 3y agoYes, but for that there would have to be no fraud. You can't know your error rate without having some known errors. Otherwise you may well be simply blind to the fraud that you do have but are not aware of. That fraud by itself is not beneficial goes without saying.
- thaumasiotes 3y agoThat is true, but it also tends to make the original statement meaningless. Now you're saying that (1) "in order to detect fraud, you have to have some fraud", and (2) "everyone everywhere, with no exceptions, has some fraud". This means there is no requirement for being able to detect fraud that is not automatically satisfied by everyone. Why bother talking about a requirement that is automatically satisfied?
- jacquesm 3y agoBecause it is the degree of fraud that you catch that matters. Every financial system has fraud. In the old days - I used to work at a bank - the banks knew that there was fraud, but usually they didn't have a really good grip on how many of their transactions were fraudulent and how much of that they caught. The limitations on human resources alone made this a losing battle. Just like any classification system a fraud control system has false positives, false negatives, true positives and true negatives. In an ideal version of such a system you have no false positives and false negatives. But that idealized version of that system (the one that perfectly classifies fraudulent transactions and non-fraudulent transactions) is static. It can't adapt to cases of fraud that it hasn't seen yet. Eventually a fraudulent transaction gets through. And that transaction if not detected timely but after the fact (so now there is some detected fraud, in the interval prior to its detection it was undetected fraud) will result in an update to the fraud detection system (probably it will need more than one example to be able to generalize from). Now the perfect system may start to generate false positives or false negatives on other transactions. Run the 'perfect' system for long enough and it will be like every other fraud control system, a certain fraction of fraud will get through and a certain fraction of good transactions will be marked as fraud. How low you can do this sustainably is an open question but there is a lot of money to be made by squeezing out the last little bits and so a lot of money is poured into these systems. The nasty bit is that many of the players in this space attempt to off-load their residual risk on others (such as merchants or consumers) and that gives them less of an incentive to do the best job they can. So that's why all of this is relevant. I hope I'm able to explain it clearly enough.