Knowing your supply chain is still going to be an important aspect of fixing this. The author is absolutely right that our build systems can be compromised, but

Knowing your supply chain is still going to be an important aspect of fixing this. The author is absolutely right that our build systems can be compromised, but securing them is another part of securing the supply chain. Managing updates carefully is still yet another aspect of securing the supply chain. Auditing (or 'deploy another agent') - is still going to be an important aspect of verifying that various parties are still operating as we would expect. Making these better are all pretty important toward hardening our systems. The proposed solution - 'run software in a way where we don't really care if it has a vulnerability, because it will happen' - is close to reality, but not quite there. The reality is that no matter how good our technical solutions are, trust ends up being a people problem, which means that compromises of that trust are going to happen. No matter how fine grained your capability based system is - if a system has the capability to do anything, then you're going to suffer loss when it is compromised. If a system gets compromised or corrupted and you don't care, then it's not a system you were using for anything useful in the first place. While capability based systems are another important part of the solution, I would counter-propose that what we're actually looking for is compartmentalization. Acknowledging the reality that parts of our system are going to be compromised, and we are going to suffer some loss when that happens, carefully controlled capabilities can help scope that blast radius of compromises.