3 ms·

That is a bad implementation, then. You could just as well design a system, where the only parties involved are the person and the party asking for identificati

by V__ 3y ago

That is a bad implementation, then. You could just as well design a system, where the only parties involved are the person and the party asking for identification. The only way to then track behavior would be to be embedded at every single business, etc. Take the German eID system, for example. Every national ID thus person has a signed certificate on the ID chip. Let's say a porn site wants to know you are over 18. They ask you to provide this. The chip response with a signed yes. No name, no other data. The site checks if the certificate is signed correctly but doesn't know anything else about you. The government also doesn't know anything about your behavior.

zeeZ 3y ago
Documentation: https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 The individual specification PDFs are in English.
AnthonyMouse 3y ago
> Every national ID thus person has a signed certificate on the ID chip. Let's say a porn site wants to know you are over 18. They ask you to provide this. The chip response with a signed yes. No name, no other data. The site checks if the certificate is signed correctly but doesn't know anything else about you. The government also doesn't know anything about your behavior. If the government knows when or how often you're requesting/generating a signature, you have a timing attack that allows use of the service to be correlated with the signatures. If anyone can generate completely anonymous signatures that no one can ever trace back to them then the system is pointless because someone will set up a service that will sign for anyone and there is no way to know who is operating it. You can't know how old someone is without knowing who they are. Otherwise they can just use someone else's ID.
- V__ 3y ago
  The certificates are generated once for each document. So every 10 years for a national ID. The information is then signed using the certificate with the helpg of your local device. Since the government is the CAA, the receiver can quickly check if a valid certificate was used, thus whether the information is valid. The certificate is saved on the chip which is embedded in the ID, preventing the user from altering the data. > You can't know how old someone is without knowing who they are. With this scheme you can. The system guaranteed that the ID used is either a certain age or above/under 18. > Otherwise they can just use someone else's ID. Just like in the real world. That is why with increasing stakes, say a bank account, additional information or tests might be needed.
  - AnthonyMouse 3y ago
    > The certificates are generated once for each document. So every 10 years for a national ID. So what stops someone from correlating your certificate with your identity and continuing to be able to do so for the next ten years? > With this scheme you can. The system guaranteed that the ID used is either a certain age or above/under 18. That's because the system knows who they are, which is the vulnerability. > Just like in the real world. In the real world your ID has your picture on it and they can compare it with your face. Also, if you're 11 years old they can tell that you're not 55 years old.
    - V__ 3y ago
      > So what stops someone from correlating your certificate with your identity and continuing to be able to do so for the next ten years? Since it is decentralized, you would need to attack every single entity (business etc.) separately. Since the transaction is not saved, you would also need to attack during the identification process. > That's because the system knows who they are, which is the vulnerability. Your ID knows who you are, that is not a vulnerability, that is the point. > your ID has your picture on it, and they can compare it with your face Fake IDs and people looking similar are also a common thing. Plese read the technical documentaions zeeZ posted, I think you are misunderstanding the concept: https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124

by V__ 3y ago

zeeZ 3y ago

Documentation: https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 The individual specification PDFs are in English.

AnthonyMouse 3y ago

> Every national ID thus person has a signed certificate on the ID chip. Let's say a porn site wants to know you are over 18. They ask you to provide this. The chip response with a signed yes. No name, no other data. The site checks if the certificate is signed correctly but doesn't know anything else about you. The government also doesn't know anything about your behavior. If the government knows when or how often you're requesting/generating a signature, you have a timing attack that allows use of the service to be correlated with the signatures. If anyone can generate completely anonymous signatures that no one can ever trace back to them then the system is pointless because someone will set up a service that will sign for anyone and there is no way to know who is operating it. You can't know how old someone is without knowing who they are. Otherwise they can just use someone else's ID.

V__ 3y ago
The certificates are generated once for each document. So every 10 years for a national ID. The information is then signed using the certificate with the helpg of your local device. Since the government is the CAA, the receiver can quickly check if a valid certificate was used, thus whether the information is valid. The certificate is saved on the chip which is embedded in the ID, preventing the user from altering the data. > You can't know how old someone is without knowing who they are. With this scheme you can. The system guaranteed that the ID used is either a certain age or above/under 18. > Otherwise they can just use someone else's ID. Just like in the real world. That is why with increasing stakes, say a bank account, additional information or tests might be needed.
- AnthonyMouse 3y ago
  > The certificates are generated once for each document. So every 10 years for a national ID. So what stops someone from correlating your certificate with your identity and continuing to be able to do so for the next ten years? > With this scheme you can. The system guaranteed that the ID used is either a certain age or above/under 18. That's because the system knows who they are, which is the vulnerability. > Just like in the real world. In the real world your ID has your picture on it and they can compare it with your face. Also, if you're 11 years old they can tell that you're not 55 years old.
  - V__ 3y ago
    > So what stops someone from correlating your certificate with your identity and continuing to be able to do so for the next ten years? Since it is decentralized, you would need to attack every single entity (business etc.) separately. Since the transaction is not saved, you would also need to attack during the identification process. > That's because the system knows who they are, which is the vulnerability. Your ID knows who you are, that is not a vulnerability, that is the point. > your ID has your picture on it, and they can compare it with your face Fake IDs and people looking similar are also a common thing. Plese read the technical documentaions zeeZ posted, I think you are misunderstanding the concept: https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03130 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124 https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/TR-03124