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Downfall fallout lawsuit: Intel knew AVX chips were insecure and did nothing
- jruohonen 3y ago"The complaint alleges that Intel has told customers since the release of its 9th generation CPUs in October 2018 that it implemented a hardware fix for the Spectre and Meltdown flaws and had mitigated those vulnerabilities on older processors. But the corporation, allegedly, knew its AVX instructions allowed a similar sort of attack."
- usr1106 3y agoIntel is nearly as criminal as Volkswagen was (and many car manufacturers that did the same, but were caught less visibly). The latter cheated with anti-pollution regulations, Intel with computer security. Maybe a slight difference is that car manufacturer with full intention violated regulations. Intel "only" neglected the knowledge their experts had that their products were insecure. In both cases they fully knowingly sold customers inferior, dangerous products without telling what they knew. Intel deserves to get massive fines and their managers deserve criminal charges as it has happened to the car industry.
- SubjectToChange 3y agoThose two cases aren’t comparable by any stretch of the imagination.
- zmgsabst 3y agoYes — Volkswagen only cheated a standards test while Intel sold a defective product.
- SubjectToChange 3y agoThe Volkswagen scandal is beyond the pale. It is genuinely difficult to understate how catastrophic it was for the company. To this day ex-CEO Martin Winterkorn is wanted for charges in the United States. As for Intel it’s difficult to judge without knowing how complicit they were. The fact it took years to for a proof of concept of Downfall to surface lends some credibility to their choices. Moreover equating a security vulnerability to being outright defective is overeager, to say the least. If that were true then you might as well sue the vendor of any lock that has been successfully picked, cut, shimmed, or broken.
- zmgsabst 3y agoThe difference between Intel and lock manufacturers is honesty. Lock manufacturers will tell you how resistant their products are to particular attacks, eg being drilled out. I wouldn’t say Intel sold defective products if they were honest — and said that speed ups came at the cost of chip level security. But they didn’t. Do you believe that Intel would have sold as many chips if they’d been honest — “our products are faster than before by trading your security for speed”?
- formerly_proven 3y ago> Lock manufacturers will tell you how resistant their products are to particular attacks, eg being drilled out. Most padlocks you can buy in Home Depot can be trivially bypassed in at least one way (typically shimming, often also vulnerable to comb picking or reaching through the core); virtually all wafer locks are highly susceptible to raking and can literally be opened with a paperclip. These are akin to admin/admin credentials. Physical security is an absolute joke most of the time compared to software security.
- SubjectToChange 3y agoI wouldn’t say Intel sold defective products if they were honest — and said that speed ups came at the cost of chip level security. But they didn’t. The trade off between risk and performance isn’t a smooth gradient in this case. Eventually conservative behavior under a certain threshold does nothing but cost performance and waste power. Therefore, the multi-billion dollar question is where that threshold is and how closely can a design toe that line. Perhaps I am wrong, but I don’t believe Intel’s management would risk a vulnerability like Downfall for better SIMD benchmarks. Do you believe that Intel would have sold as many chips if they’d been honest — “our products are faster than before by trading your security for speed”? Outside of the “prosumer” market, the vast majority of retail consumers do not even look at CPU benchmarks, nor could they understand them if they did. The true target of those performance numbers is the enterprise segment, a reoccurring multi-billion dollar revenue stream for Intel. With that in mind, it makes about as much sense for Intel to ignore vulnerabilities for benchmarks as it does for a milkman to sell spoiled milk.
- BlueTemplar 3y agoA huge difference seems to be that in the diesel case the cheating was an open secret for decades, with even amateur journals describing how it worked a decade before the "scandal" blew out.
- SubjectToChange 3y agoOver the past decade hardware complexity, and competitive pressure, has drastically increased. At the same time verification methodologies and tools have failed to keep pace. This can even be seen in the steady increase of errata in Intel’s architecture manuals, and they are hardly alone in that respect.
- pgeorgi 3y agoThe problem is that Intel tries to "solve" security by adding new layers on top of the gargantuan mess of layers that already exists instead of reevaluating decisions made 30 years ago and dealing with compatibility issues through emulation.
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- SubjectToChange 3y agoWhat is this mess you are referring to? And what decisions made 30 years ago need to be reevaluated?
- simfree 3y agoShipping silicon changes takes 3 years minimum, though usually 4 to 5 years depending on where a chip is at in its design cycle. Asking silicon manufacturers to be nimble and respin chips already in the pipeline is not realistic given the huge lead times these vendors have to change their chips.
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- treprinum 3y agoAre we going to prosecute all long-tail problems in any product? Often it takes years or decades to unveil a problem and changing a chip design is multi-year task. So even if Intel knew AVX could lead to attacks, a timely fix might not have been possible.
- usr1106 3y agoA fix, no. But a warning to customers would have been a matter of days even with lawyers involved.
- joenathanone 3y ago> Are we going to prosecute all long-tail problems in any product? Hopefully yes, if it’s proven the vendor knew but released anyway or didn’t disclose.
- imglorp 3y agoRealistically, no. Security is not a feature people are dying to pay for, it's just overhead. Look at Experian, on the front page again, still insecure. It's cheaper to make the defective product and say you're a little sorry, now and then.
- _8j50 3y agoTheir decision not to fix is not the problem, their decision to keep the flaw a secret and sell products with a performance expectation set and then release patches that slow down that paid for performance is.
- SubjectToChange 3y agomitigations=off Anyone who needs out-of-the-box performance can get it if they're willing to accept out-of-the-box security. Of course that doesn't make these side-channel attacks any less frustrating. For instance the original Meltdown and Spectre attacks were on my mind when I chose to "vote with my dollar" and buy an AMD CPU, only to end up with Zenbleed this year lol
- mibsl 3y agoThe problem described in 2018 seems completely unrelated to downfall. It looks like a potential optimization to the original spectre, doesn't even mention AVX gather instructions. I don't see this going anywhere.
- yyyk 3y ago* I can't think of any case where Downfall or the AVX vulnerabilities have been used in the wild. It seems too complicated/unnecessary to use in practice even against high-value targets. The lawsuit cannot demonstrate real damage or risk for the plaintiffs if the mitigation is just turned off. (It may be a real risk in other settings like Cloud hosting - but none of these companies filed or joined the lawsuit) * Even if we completely accepted the prosecution's dubious theory, the buyers had 5 years of decent use of the product. That's an acceptable period for warranties and a typical personal computer lifetime.
- Am4TIfIsER0ppos 3y agoNow how are you going to have javascript speculatively executing avx gather instructions? Are OSes going to disable avx now too?