2 ms·
* Use a non-standard ssh port If someone has your private ssh key, then they presumably have access to your client-side ssh configuration. This might prevent r
by pyre 15y ago
* Use a non-standard ssh port
If someone has your private ssh key, then they presumably have access to your client-side ssh configuration. This might prevent random Internet attacks, but this doesn't do much against a targeted attack (which is what someone will do once they jack your private key).
* Disable root ssh login
If your private key isn't authorized for root anyways, this doesn't really matter. This is just a point of general ssh security, not a protection against stolen private keys.
* Configure 'Single Packet Authorization and Port Knocking' --
http://www.cipherdyne.org/fwknop/
As with point 1, if someone is able to jack your private ssh key, they probably have enough access to view your ssh config.
* Have decent iptables rules. Use either fail2ban or denyhosts
with stringent rules, if you must, that ban on 3+ failed
logins.
If someone steals your private key, then they won't have any failed login attempts. I'm unsure how you feel this makes using a password-less private key anymore secure.
* Have a whitelist of acceptable IP's for ssh access
This presumably defeats the purpose of ssh mobility.
* Use any system of 2-factor authentication. I'm partial to
Google's Authenticator. Here're some directions to get that
set up, if anyone is interested:
Using a password (something you know) + private key (something you have) already is two-factor authentication.