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It is simply not true that using any service on the Internet requires you to trust the government. I do appreciate the clarity with which we can associate that
by tptacek 3y ago
It is simply not true that using any service on the Internet requires you to trust the government. I do appreciate the clarity with which we can associate that idea with DNSSEC advocacy, though. "30 years of Internet privacy research have shown: we should just give up and let governments run the show, they're going to anyways".
Unfortunately, the IETF has categorically rejected that argument:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7624 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7624
- lmm 3y agoIt's not that I want to trust governments more. I want to get away from the "flat list of 170+ root certificates" model because I want to trust a bunch of governments (not least that of the US) less! Is your argument with the RFC that content exfiltration is always more costly than active network attacks? Obviously all else being equal that's true, but it's an overly simplistic model when multiple countries come into play - for a government, an active network attack against a foreign power is much more costly than any king of attack, even content exfiltration, against a company within your country.