The actual enforcement mechanism is the root store programs, i.e. the browsers ultimately decide. The CA/Browser forum is supposed to be a cooperative way for C

The actual enforcement mechanism is the root store programs, i.e. the browsers ultimately decide. The CA/Browser forum is supposed to be a cooperative way for CAs and Browsers to agree technical standards but on the CA side this self regulation doesn't always work. Perhaps the best "big name" distrusted CA would be Symantec: https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/03/12/distrust-symantec-tls-certificates/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2018/03/12/distrust-symant... Others include WoSign and StartCom. The problem with eIDAS is that browsers can no longer police these CAs, as they are legally mandated to carry them. There needs to be a mechanism whereby such a CA can be distrusted, doubly so if it is issuing "qualified" certificates (if it cannot get the basics right it should not attest to someone's legal identity). On the flip side to this there is nothing stopping Europe distributing additional roots that install themselves in browsers. I work in finance and we operate several closed CAs. Our clients install our CAs all the time. It just would not be on by default nor pop up the EV bit. But that does not stop the digital wallet software (the motivation for this) peering into the certificate itself and making sure it is a qualified certificate.