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You ever have a debate about "defense in depth" versus "multiple single points of failure"? That's the DNSSEC dilemma (or one of them at least). People think th
by tptacek 3y ago
You ever have a debate about "defense in depth" versus "multiple single points of failure"? That's the DNSSEC dilemma (or one of them at least). People think they're getting a "decentralized" system. But there are few systems on the Internet more centralized than the DNS, which is tree structured, and which by design delegates authority to world governments.
Appeals to DNSSEC as a decentralization method tend to assume that (a) there are TLDs that are both accessible and reasonably insulated from governmental privacy interference (this is trickier than it looks; .IO, for instance, is squarely within the jurisdiction of the world's most unhinged signals intelligence agency), and that (b) moving established properties to those new TLDs has a reasonable cost, which it virtually never does.
- lmm 3y agoUsing any web service requires implicitly trusting the government (in the sense of the entity that can give orders that men with guns will follow; not necessarily the party currently in power, in the case of places that have checks and balances) of wherever it's hosted. Not being also obliged to trust 170-odd other governmental and nongovernmental entities would be a step up (I know certificate transparency helps with this to a certain extent, but being a root CA is still a privileged status; really I should be able to use a .foo domain without putting any trust in entities outside foo)
- tptacek 3y agoIt is simply not true that using any service on the Internet requires you to trust the government. I do appreciate the clarity with which we can associate that idea with DNSSEC advocacy, though. "30 years of Internet privacy research have shown: we should just give up and let governments run the show, they're going to anyways". Unfortunately, the IETF has categorically rejected that argument: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7624 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7624
- lmm 3y agoIt's not that I want to trust governments more. I want to get away from the "flat list of 170+ root certificates" model because I want to trust a bunch of governments (not least that of the US) less! Is your argument with the RFC that content exfiltration is always more costly than active network attacks? Obviously all else being equal that's true, but it's an overly simplistic model when multiple countries come into play - for a government, an active network attack against a foreign power is much more costly than any king of attack, even content exfiltration, against a company within your country.
- Elucalidavah 3y ago> assume ... there are TLDs that are both accessible and reasonably insulated from governmental privacy interference Would be nice if the root servers delegated some TLDs to various experimental projects like blockchain-based name systems and OpenNIC and such (i.e. making domains under those TLDs resolvable for everyone).