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What inconsistencies would you encounter? It would seem that a solipsistic view is trivially consistent. Any phenomenon you experience has a simple explanation

What inconsistencies would you encounter? It would seem that a solipsistic view is trivially consistent. Any phenomenon you experience has a simple explanation : that's how it was designed for you. Conversely, a non-solipsistic view demands explanations for an unimaginable plethora of phenomena. Everything you observe from the subatomic to the cosmological to people eating Tide Pods has aspects that are difficult to explain.

mannykannot 3y ago
I'm not convinced that there are unavoidable inconsistencies, but I suggested it would be difficult for a rational solipsist to define concepts such as the self, justification and reality (all of which are concepts needed in order to take any position on solipsism), and I don't see how saying "it's just how it was designed for me" gets the job done; in fact, this introduces another concept, design, in need of definition. If you could present a more worked-out example of how a rational solipsist would define the concept of reality without, at any point, adopting a non-solipsist stance (such as using the concept of design), I might be more convinced. Furthermore, a rational solipist does not avoid any of the questions faced by non-solipsists: wherever the latter asks "why is it that... and not something else?", the rational solipsist has the question "why does it seem that... and not something else?" Saying "it was designed that way" is no more of an explanation than "it is that way", and the rational solipsist will realize that this is so. Perhaps you are thinking of brains-in-vats or simulations in their own simulated universe? If such an entity supposed that it was a brain-in-a-vat or a simulation, however, it would not be a rational solipsist, as these hypotheses presume a reality beyond their experiences (in any such case, of course, the non-solipsist brain-in-a-vat or simulation would be mistaken about what reality lies beyond its experiences, but nevertheless, there would be such a reality.)
- whelp_24 3y ago
  There are different forms, but isn't the main one just that you can only prove the existence of your own mind? If there is a reality beyond your senses that you cannot interact with, does it matter to you? A brain in a vat hallucinating a universe, is the same thing as just hallucinating a universe with no further reality, is the same thing as being in a particularly vivid dream, is the same a being a simulation. The idea that a brain must exist somewhere in a vat to present this reality to you, came from your mind. If some of the rules of your reality are entirely disconnected with your senses, why not all?
  - mannykannot 3y ago
    When you say there are different forms, I think you mean different forms of solipsism. If that is what you meant, then I think this discussion is circling back to my original post, in this sense: you are demonstrating that one can have a rational discussion about it. What I am not so convinced about, however, is whether one could rationally be a solipsist - to really (that word again!) believe that (to pick one particular definition for concreteness) the self is the only reality. In this regard, the inability to disprove solipsism is not sufficient to be a justification for believing it; if it were, the mirror argument would equally justify not-solipsism, and so a rational person should regard both arguments as inconclusive. I only mentioned brains-in-vats and simulations because I wondered whether mypalmike had them in mind, and only to say that I don't think it matters whether or not the putative solipsist is either of these things. Rather than continue in this vein, I will point you to an article which concludes with the section "The Incoherence of Solipsism": One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is, a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/ https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/
svnt 3y ago
> It would seem that a solipsistic view is trivially consistent. Any phenomenon you experience has a simple explanation : that's how it was designed for you. Designed for you by whom? And when? That is the problem.

mannykannot 3y ago

I'm not convinced that there are unavoidable inconsistencies, but I suggested it would be difficult for a rational solipsist to define concepts such as the self, justification and reality (all of which are concepts needed in order to take any position on solipsism), and I don't see how saying "it's just how it was designed for me" gets the job done; in fact, this introduces another concept, design, in need of definition. If you could present a more worked-out example of how a rational solipsist would define the concept of reality without, at any point, adopting a non-solipsist stance (such as using the concept of design), I might be more convinced. Furthermore, a rational solipist does not avoid any of the questions faced by non-solipsists: wherever the latter asks "why is it that... and not something else?", the rational solipsist has the question "why does it seem that... and not something else?" Saying "it was designed that way" is no more of an explanation than "it is that way", and the rational solipsist will realize that this is so. Perhaps you are thinking of brains-in-vats or simulations in their own simulated universe? If such an entity supposed that it was a brain-in-a-vat or a simulation, however, it would not be a rational solipsist, as these hypotheses presume a reality beyond their experiences (in any such case, of course, the non-solipsist brain-in-a-vat or simulation would be mistaken about what reality lies beyond its experiences, but nevertheless, there would be such a reality.)

whelp_24 3y ago
There are different forms, but isn't the main one just that you can only prove the existence of your own mind? If there is a reality beyond your senses that you cannot interact with, does it matter to you? A brain in a vat hallucinating a universe, is the same thing as just hallucinating a universe with no further reality, is the same thing as being in a particularly vivid dream, is the same a being a simulation. The idea that a brain must exist somewhere in a vat to present this reality to you, came from your mind. If some of the rules of your reality are entirely disconnected with your senses, why not all?
- mannykannot 3y ago
  When you say there are different forms, I think you mean different forms of solipsism. If that is what you meant, then I think this discussion is circling back to my original post, in this sense: you are demonstrating that one can have a rational discussion about it. What I am not so convinced about, however, is whether one could rationally be a solipsist - to really (that word again!) believe that (to pick one particular definition for concreteness) the self is the only reality. In this regard, the inability to disprove solipsism is not sufficient to be a justification for believing it; if it were, the mirror argument would equally justify not-solipsism, and so a rational person should regard both arguments as inconclusive. I only mentioned brains-in-vats and simulations because I wondered whether mypalmike had them in mind, and only to say that I don't think it matters whether or not the putative solipsist is either of these things. Rather than continue in this vein, I will point you to an article which concludes with the section "The Incoherence of Solipsism": One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is, a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/ https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/

svnt 3y ago

> It would seem that a solipsistic view is trivially consistent. Any phenomenon you experience has a simple explanation : that's how it was designed for you. Designed for you by whom? And when? That is the problem.