I understand the point you're making, but the statement that > they would have been unlikely to work on nuclear weapons development, and millions more would ha

I understand the point you're making, but the statement that > they would have been unlikely to work on nuclear weapons development, and millions more would have likely perished in a land invasion of Japan despite being constantly repeated, is not reflected by contemporary documents and later historical analysis of decision making among Pentagon and White House officials. The threat of an impending land invasion was not a consideration at the time when it was decided to attack Japanese civilian centres with nuclear weapons. The primary factor in the decision for their use had far more to do with the risk of Stalin joining the fight on the eastern front and thus securing a claim for territory following the inevitable axis surrender, as well as a desire for US power projection from the demonstration of an atomic weapon in War. The primary delay in Japanese surrender was the question of the fate of Empreror Hirohito, who the US ended up protecting anyway.