Using a TPM for remote attestation of device state is basically worthless in the generic PC UEFI world because there is pretty much unlimited surface area for h

Using a TPM for remote attestation of device state is basically worthless in the generic PC UEFI world because there is pretty much unlimited surface area for holes to leverage, from motherboards that falsely report secure boot states to firmware bypasses to using your own TPM to just exploiting a vulnerable kernel driver that has a valid windows codesigning signature. In practice places that want "attestation-like" functionality, like Riot do for anti-cheat, just load mandatory kernel modules instead and require e.g. Type 1 hypervisor-based security in Windows to be enabled. Or they just obfuscate everything and run blobs. These can still be bypassed but it's still difficult and in contrast fully controlled by their software stack, which is more usable for them for more players. It's good enough, in other words.