4 ms·
Keylogger leaks data via Apple AirTag network
- codersfocus 3y agoThis wouldn’t really be any different from using the cell network to transmit the data.
- JCharante 3y agoBut this doesn’t require the attacker to have access to a cell network
- c0balt 3y agoAnd more importantly is also a lot more likely to not be detected by an ISP or similar actor.
- wkat4242 3y agoIt's pretty undetectable even by Apple due to the way Find My works. The receiving of the data, not the sending is the most detectable part. Because you need to modify a Mac app to get the raw data.
- mckirk 3y agoIt is different, because this doesn't need cellular connectivity and can even bridge air gaps. Afaik, your iPhone will happily cache found FindMy beacons and send them out once it has internet connection again.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- vlovich123 3y agoIs there more details on this attack? This part is failing the sniff test for me: > The attacker cannot manipulate the content of the location report, but he can specify the hash that is used to store the location report in the Apple network, cleverly encode the bits and bytes he wishes to transmit within the hash, and retrieve it. By retrieving the location reports, he can find out what data his keylogger has sent. Since the retrieval is effecte via the Internet, the attacker can be in any location at the time. How is the keylogger downloading this information from the AirTag network? Wouldn’t you need to authenticate with Apple APIs to retrieve information? This would be required because even though it can send data, a keylogger would need to know what’s been sent to confirm the receiver has everything in the right order since the location data is capturing state in a lossy manner…
- bobivl 3y agoThere is a longer article [1] describing the attack, but it is in German and behind a paywall. [1] https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/c-t-deckt-auf-Keylogger-nutzt-Apples-Ortungsnetz-Wo-ist-9342171.html https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/c-t-deckt-auf-Keylogger-nut...
- Doe-_ 3y agoThe location report is signed with a public key advertised by the "lost" device. To retrieve the device's location and to prevent Apple from knowing who lost the device, all signed in users can download any location report for a given public key. This is explained better here: https://github.com/seemoo-lab/openhaystack https://github.com/seemoo-lab/openhaystack
- vlovich123 3y agoThat doesn’t explain how the keylogger obtains the set of things uploaded. Or is it just spamming the network and hope all the updates make it? Like you don’t even know which beacon made it out
- dagmx 3y agoYep, that’s pretty much it. There doesn’t seem to be a guarantee that you’ll get all the “packets”. I’m not sure what the Find My update rate is either so I don’t imagine this will be very effective to exfiltrate data.
- wkat4242 3y agoSometimes a few bytes can be very valuable. Think of the signing keys of Microsoft or a high value bitcoin wallet. And these things lose their value quickly once the target knows you have them so this kind of almost undetectable exfiltration is smart. And packet loss can be mitigated with resending, and/or high amounts of parity data.
- wkat4242 3y agoWow that's a really smart exfiltration technique. Also really hard to block :(