The article at ComputerWeekly is that with the critical content: https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366557952/EU-eIDAS-reforms-should-be-actively-resisted-say

The article at ComputerWeekly is that with the critical content: https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366557952/EU-eIDAS-reforms-should-be-actively-resisted-say-experts https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366557952/EU-eIDAS-refor... > The proposed Article 45 now gives EU member states the ability to insert new root certificates at will, which supposedly improves security for website users by giving them a new way to obtain authentic information about who operates a website. However, the group believes that in practice this will have the opposite effect. For example, if one member state – or a recognised third-party state – adds a new authority to the EU Trusted List, its certificate will legally have to be added to all browsers and distributed across the entire EU as a trusted certificate. At this point, if the government were to use the outlined substitution technique, it would gain the ability to intercept the web traffic of not only its own citizens, but everybody in the EU, and harvest confidential data such as financial information, medical records and so on > The issues with Article 45 do not stop there, for it also bans security checks on EU web certificates unless permitted by regulation when establishing encrypted connections. As opposed to specifying a baseline of minimum security measures, it specifies an upper bound on them, which cannot be improved upon without explicit permission from ETSI. According to the group, this goes against every established norm when new security technologies are rolled out, and effectively limits the security measures that can be taken to secure the web in the EU