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That seems impressive, I agree, and I'm all for giving credit where it's due. But the problem with looking only for "fingerprints" is that you're inherently nar
by jonnathanson 15y ago
That seems impressive, I agree, and I'm all for giving credit where it's due. But the problem with looking only for "fingerprints" is that you're inherently narrowing your search spectrum. By doing so, you're actually making the job easier for terrorists -- whose goal, roughly speaking, is to move to wherever the spotlight isn't shining.
Bruce Schneier does a much better job explaining this phenomenon than I can ever hope to. But essentially, there's a good argument to be made that totally random searches are superior to fingerprint searches. Terrorists operate on probabilistic scenario analysis. They will only attempt a plot if they're close to 100% sure that they can pull it off, because a failure embarrasses them in the eyes of their sympathizers and would-be financial benefactors. It makes them look like amateurs, and nobody wants to fund an amateurish organization. So even doing something like randomly screening every Nth passenger (where N changes daily) inherently reduces the odds of success by a fixed daily percentage. Terrorists are more scared of dice rolls than they are of fingerprint searches.
I'm no security expert, and for all I know, some combination of random searches and fingerprint searches is the optimal portfolio. I can, at least, understand the logic there, and it makes some sense. But focusing solely on fingerprints creates loopholes everywhere else. And it seems that the TSA has become more and more laser-focused on fingerprints in recent years.
- mark_integerdsv 15y agoNot long ago some Israeli security hard cases explained how they handle this issue at Ben Gurion. You can probably still find it online somewhere, basically their monitors are highly trained in profiling and they use psychology and hyper profiling to spot potential threats. I want to say it works like a bomb but...
- jonnathanson 15y agoI've heard bits and pieces about the Israeli methodology, and I've also heard critiques of its potential for application in the US (mostly, centering on the idea that our population is too big, too diverse, and too spread out to accommodate the training and consistency of the Israeli program). Whatever the case, one thing does seem fairly clear: that the Israeli investment in people, rather than machines, seems to be paying a good dividend. And I'm tempted to say that we'd be better off staffing airports with better people and slightly older / less intrusive machines, rather than cutting-edge machines and bottom-of-the-barrel staff.