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Salting a standard cryptographic hash (like SHA2) doesn't do anything meaningful to slow a brute force attack. This problem is the reason we have password KDFs
by tptacek 3y ago
Salting a standard cryptographic hash (like SHA2) doesn't do anything meaningful to slow a brute force attack. This problem is the reason we have password KDFs like scrypt.
(I don't care about this Bear analytics thing at all, and just clicked the comment thread to see if it was the Bear I thought it was; I do care about people's misconceptions about hashing.)
- alkonaut 3y agoWhat do you mean by "brute force" in the context of reversing PII that has been obscured by a one way hash? My IP number passed through SHA1 with a salt (a salt I generated and stored safely on my end) is 6FF6BA399B75F5698CEEDB2B1716C46D12C28DF5 Since this is all that would be sent over the wire for analytics, this is the only information an attacker will have available. The only thing you can brute force from that is some IP and some salt such that SHA1(IP+Salt) = 6FF6BA399B75F5698CEEDB2B1716C46D12C28DF5 But you'll find millions of such IPs. Perhaps all possible IP's will work with some salt, and give that hash. It's not revealing my IP even if you manage to find a match?
- infinityio 3y agoIf you also explicitly mentioned the salt used (as bear appear to have done?), this just becomes a matter of testing 4 billion options and seeing which matches
- alkonaut 3y agoI think it's just unsalted in the example code. Or you could argue that the date is kind of used as a salt. But the point was that salting + hashing is fine for PII in telemetry if and only if the salt stays on the client. It might be difficult to do without JS though.
- remram 3y agoWhat does "stay on the client" mean? It has to be consistent across visits and you don't want to use cookies (otherwise you don't need to mess with addresses at all). You have no option except sending every client the same salt.
- alkonaut 3y agoIn this context it means exactly that: staying on the client. And yes that means using cookies (or rather, local storage probably). So this is requiring consent no matter how you do it. But note that the system in the article also requires consent since it sends PII (the IP) over the wire and saves it on the server. It's reversible and not anonymous - so it's even worse than using a cookie without consent I'd say. Yes if all you ever want to send is a unique visitor ID then there is no point in having a local hash, because you can just generate a random ID and use that to identify the user. What I mean is that if you want to send multiple pieces of PII (such as an IP, a filename, a username,...) then the only way to do that safely is to send hash(salt+filename) for example, where the salt is not known to the server receiving the hash. The IP in the suggestion to use a locally stored hash here just represented "PII that should be sent anonymously" and not "A good way of identifying a unique system".
- michaelmior 3y ago> Salting a standard cryptographic hash (like SHA2) doesn't do anything meaningful to slow a brute force attack. Sure, but it does at least prevent the use of rainbow tables. Arguably not relevant in this scenario, but it doesn't mean that salting does nothing. Rainbow tables can speed up attacks by many orders of magnitude. Salting may not prevent each individual password from being brute forced, but for most attackers, it probably will prevent your entire database from being compromised due to the amount of computation required.
- tptacek 3y agoRainbow tables don't matter. If you're discussing the strength of your scheme with or without rainbow tables, you have already lost. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38098188 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38098188
- robertlagrant 3y agoThat's just a link where you claim the same thing. What's your actual rationale? Do you think salting is pointless?
- tptacek 3y agoI think it's meaningless. Every password KDF is randomized. But randomization isn't what makes them difficult to brute-force; non-password-KDF "salted" hashes are extremely easy to brute force, which is the whole reason we have password KDFs. "Salted hashes" are one of the more treacherous security cargo cults, because they create the impression that the big problem you have to solve hashing a password is somehow mixing in a salt. No: just doing that by itself doesn't accomplish anything meaningful at all.
- robertlagrant 3y agoUnderstood, but I think this is just people using "hash" and "KDF" interchangeably. Agree that a KDF is the way to go, but salting it is also a good idea to explode the search space.