4 ms·

> Free will seems to be qualitatively different to randomness. There is no such thing as free will, so any attempt to define it will fail. If we naively defin

> Free will seems to be qualitatively different to randomness. There is no such thing as free will, so any attempt to define it will fail. If we naively define it as something that isn't just pure randomness, but also something that isn't pure causality, then what is it? Either things are causal, in which case, you can replay everything and arrive at the same point. That doens't fit an intuitive definition of free will. Or there is randomness, play the same sequence of events again and some inherent randomness will cause a different outcome. That also doesn't fit any intuitive sense of free will. So, since we can't even define it, it is meaningless to assume there is free will in the first place. We can talk in terms of causality or randomness.

eigenket 3y ago
> Either things are causal, in which case, you can replay everything and arrive at the same point. That doens't fit an intuitive definition of free will. I think this is somewhat inaccurate. I'm not sure if I personally agree with it, but at the very least compatibilism is a serious philosophical viewpoint and shouldn't just be dismissed like this. In any case I think the concept of "free will" is pretty much independent of randomness. If you provide me with some source of randomness (e.g. some quantum random number generator) I don't think I get more free because of it.
stiiv 3y ago
There's an incongruity between a "mechanistic" model of causality and how we actually live, and actually should live. Your explanation is a good response to the posted experiment, but I don't think it's a good response to common sense, especially when we consider important (largely pragmatic) concepts like agency and responsibility.
naasking 3y ago
> If we naively define it as something that isn't just pure randomness, but also something that isn't pure causality, then what is it? Read up on Compatibilism. Free will can be defined in a way that's compatible with determinism. A deliberation over values resulting in a justification for a choice, aka "reasons" or "will". When you are "free" to act in accordance with those reasons, ie. you haven't been coerced into acting against your own reasons, then you've made a choice of your own free will. Simple and totally compatible with determinism.

eigenket 3y ago

> Either things are causal, in which case, you can replay everything and arrive at the same point. That doens't fit an intuitive definition of free will. I think this is somewhat inaccurate. I'm not sure if I personally agree with it, but at the very least compatibilism is a serious philosophical viewpoint and shouldn't just be dismissed like this. In any case I think the concept of "free will" is pretty much independent of randomness. If you provide me with some source of randomness (e.g. some quantum random number generator) I don't think I get more free because of it.

stiiv 3y ago

There's an incongruity between a "mechanistic" model of causality and how we actually live, and actually should live. Your explanation is a good response to the posted experiment, but I don't think it's a good response to common sense, especially when we consider important (largely pragmatic) concepts like agency and responsibility.

naasking 3y ago

> If we naively define it as something that isn't just pure randomness, but also something that isn't pure causality, then what is it? Read up on Compatibilism. Free will can be defined in a way that's compatible with determinism. A deliberation over values resulting in a justification for a choice, aka "reasons" or "will". When you are "free" to act in accordance with those reasons, ie. you haven't been coerced into acting against your own reasons, then you've made a choice of your own free will. Simple and totally compatible with determinism.