6 ms·
WebAuthn.wtf
- blibble 3y agoit's a shame webauthn didn't permit a way of registering a token not in your physical possession I don't want to have to drive to my parents/bank safety deposit box each time I register on a new website (and allowing the private key to be exported and shared defeats the point entirely)
- Mindless2112 3y agoAside from your email account and maybe a few other critical accounts, you should probably just not bother. If you lose your passkey there should be a "lost passkey" flow just like there has been for a forgotten password.
- anotherhue 3y agoEveryone knows there's no way to encrypt with one key and decrypt with another.
- goalieca 3y agoEach website should have a unique signing key. This is how you prevent one site from logging into another since the login is now just a signed challenge.
- postalrat 3y agoDoes anything get stored on the device when you register on a site? As far as I know it does not.
- goalieca 3y ago> YubiKeys can store a maximum of 25 passkeys. We are evaluating increasing this in the future because of the likely increase in fully passwordless experiences across the web that require them.
- jiveturkey 3y agoThis is up to the authenticator and is completely possible.
- danShumway 3y agohttps://webauthn.wtf/how-it-works/support https://webauthn.wtf/how-it-works/support > WebAuthn is supported by a wide range of devices and platforms, including desktop computers, laptops, smartphones, and tablets. Check out passkeys.dev for more information on device support and compatibility of passkeys across different devices. And then the support table is at https://passkeys.dev/device-support https://passkeys.dev/device-support, via website that is maintained by members of the WebAuthn working group. Still no real Linux support, general Linux is still not listed as a target for support, only Ubuntu. The most important support categories have no support planned according to the passkeys.dev website. And no, FIDO hardware keys or cross-device authentication are not sufficient support, as this site itself admits: > One option is to register passkeys on two devices: one that is carried for everyday use and another that is kept in a secure location as a backup. That solution is cumbersome, and most people are not going to bother. If you only have a phone and a Linux desktop computer, it means that backup that's available immediately on multiple devices is going to be much more difficult. Of course, the Passkeys.dev site is out of date; in theory 1Password can actually be used as a local provider on Linux (although I haven't tested it, so in before I'm wrong about that). 1Password is proprietary and doesn't allow export currently, but even so you'd think that the site would be updated. But nah, we'll just force everyone with questions to browse blogs and Twitter to get them answered. It's a fun scavenger hunt we're all doing where we try to figure out where the heck Passkeys can and can't be used. ---- Also no mention at all from either site about cross-ecosystem compatibility (ie, export/import); it's nice that passkey proponents have done a 180 from "ecosystem transfer is harmful and shouldn't be supported" to "of course we always intended to support ecosystem transfer and it's definitely coming" -- but again, would be nice to see anything at all official about that or a timeline. Why am I finding out about cross-ecosystem compatibility from Reddit posts, isn't there an alliance somewhere around here made up of some of the richest companies on earth that could help with messaging? ---- Passkeys have the potential to be great, but they are early development, they have heavy caveats, there are problems with the spec, and they are being recommended to people today even though there is no officially advertised Open implementation for local providers that works cross-platform (Bitwarden support hasn't launched yet, and I haven't been able to find another Open Source provider advertised through FIDO's certification program). So in their current state they are objectively, factually, vendor lock-in, even if that is intended to change in the future. They shouldn't be recommended to ordinary users today, it is irresponsible for tech companies to be advertising them in a half-finished state. ---- This website appears to be a 3rd-party effort, so it's unreasonable to blame it for the problems that the actual FIDO Alliance has with messaging and communication and development priorities. The company that made this site very likely has no power to change anything about what the FIDO Alliance is doing. And it's good to get more informative resources about Passkeys, I particularly appreciate clear developer guides around providers. So I don't want to make it sound like I'm complaining about the site; I'm happy that FusionAuth set this up. And FusionAuth is aiming this site primarily at developers, not users, so I'm not even mad about that. But it's still kind of a band-aide over communication problems that the FIDO Alliance itself needs to address, and it papers over the reality that passkeys in their current form aren't ready for normal users yet. Stuff like export/import isn't optional; if I can't export keys from iCloud or Android, then passkeys are not ready for normal users.
- DavideNL 3y agoSo is it true that the website/server can "dictate" which password-client/vendor users are allowed to use and which not ? (don't see this addressed in the article.) For example: Apple native (not) allowed, 1Password (not) allowed, Bitwarden (not) allowed, KeePassXC (not) allowed, etc.
- m-p-3 3y agoMicrosoft Azure lets you restrict which Authenticator Attestation GUIDs (AAGUIDs) that are allowed when enrolling a FIDO2 key. Example for Yubikey https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016648959 https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016648959 So you could technically restrict which FIDO2 key models are allowed at the server level.
- danShumway 3y ago> A Relying Party can request attestation during passkey registration. Attestation provides additional information about the legitimacy of the authenticator device and can be used by the Relying Party to make a trust decision for the authenticator. According to the WebAuthn specification, authenticators should provide some form of attestation, but it is not required, and authenticators vary in the type and format of attestation statements they can provide. Currently, iOS zeros out attestation information for roaming keys, but that's not dictated by the spec and different authenticators may choose to provide attestation. ---- Relying Parties can also specify feature requirements for user validation/verification: > The user verification requirement. The ability to provide user verification enhances the security of the ceremony, but it may not be necessary for all use cases. Interestingly, user verification can not only be required, it can also be discouraged(https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#enum-userVerificationRequirement https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#enum-user...): > This value indicates that the Relying Party does not want user verification employed during the operation (e.g., in the interest of minimizing disruption to the user interaction flow). And they can indicate that they only want to be used with a platform authenticator instead of a roaming authenticator. ---- Of course, without attestation there is no way to force the authenticator to actually do anything that is asked of it or to identify itself in any way, but it can be assumed that most 3rd-party authenticators are probably not going to lie? Certainly not if they're trying to get certified. Relying parties can set preferred authenticators and they can query authenticators on a device to get a list of discoverable keys, but I'm not sure if there's any expectation that platforms should refuse to work if a preferred authenticator isn't present. ---- There's more information at https://webauthn.wtf/how-it-works/registration#the-options https://webauthn.wtf/how-it-works/registration#the-options and https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#dictionary-makecredentialoptions https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#dictionar.... In particular, Relying parties can dictate that duplicate passkeys should not be created for an account. They can also specify extensions that open the door to other requirements: > This member contains additional parameters requesting additional processing by the client and authenticator. For example, the caller may request that only authenticators with certain capabilities be used to create the credential, or that particular information be returned in the attestation object. To me, https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#dictdef-authenticatorselectioncriteria https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/WD-webauthn-3-20210427/#dictdef-a... seems to suggest that specific authenticators can be required, but I very well could be misreading that section, so don't quote me on that. And again, without attestation, there's nothing to prevent an authenticator from lying, but... will they lie if push comes to shove? And will the FIDO Alliance tolerate that? ---- In general, the FIDO Alliance's attitude towards all of this is "yes, we're giving Relying Parties a ton of power, but come on, it's not like they would ever use it." There is no requirement in the spec that I'm aware of that would dictate that certified Relying Parties must be vendor neutral and must not try to restrict smaller authenticators.