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That seems reasonable, but the only real world examples I can think of come with inconsistent outlooks. The ESRB formed when video games were at risk of being r

by mkr-hn 15y ago

That seems reasonable, but the only real world examples I can think of come with inconsistent outlooks. The ESRB formed when video games were at risk of being regulated. Since then video games soared past the movie industry. The counterexample to that is the CCA, which is largely credited with keeping the comic book industry from diversifying and expanding. What is needed to make self-regulatory organizations work out as well as the ESRB?

JoshTriplett 15y ago
The regulatory situation I described only applies when some serious problem exists that will cause harm to others, but no existing law makes people liable for causing that harm, and no other financial incentive exists to self-regulate (e.g. the target market doesn't actually care about the problem in question). In such cases, regulation might make sense; I suggested that such regulation should just address the harm caused rather than the details of what (at the time of regulation) seem like the "right" steps to prevent that harm. In the case of the ESRB and the CCA, self-regulation serves primarily as a marketing tool, with varying degrees of success; a strong financial incentive already exists to self-regulate. The ESRB works reasonably well because it helps the gaming industry target a broad age range and have everyone get what they want and expect. The Comics Code and similar systems worked badly because they attempted to censor rather than just label, and because they didn't do a good job of keeping up with what target audiences wanted; CCA failed because it no longer provided value to anyone. Similarly, the automobile industry introduces a huge number of safety features because their target market cares deeply about safety; most such features don't come from regulatory requirements, and even the mandated features would continue to exist in the absence of regulation, because people demand them. Advertising for vehicles often touts independent safety ratings as primary selling points. So, self-regulation works out very well when the target market wants it as a feature. It doesn't work well by itself when it provides no value to the target market.

by mkr-hn 15y ago

JoshTriplett 15y ago

The regulatory situation I described only applies when some serious problem exists that will cause harm to others, but no existing law makes people liable for causing that harm, and no other financial incentive exists to self-regulate (e.g. the target market doesn't actually care about the problem in question). In such cases, regulation might make sense; I suggested that such regulation should just address the harm caused rather than the details of what (at the time of regulation) seem like the "right" steps to prevent that harm. In the case of the ESRB and the CCA, self-regulation serves primarily as a marketing tool, with varying degrees of success; a strong financial incentive already exists to self-regulate. The ESRB works reasonably well because it helps the gaming industry target a broad age range and have everyone get what they want and expect. The Comics Code and similar systems worked badly because they attempted to censor rather than just label, and because they didn't do a good job of keeping up with what target audiences wanted; CCA failed because it no longer provided value to anyone. Similarly, the automobile industry introduces a huge number of safety features because their target market cares deeply about safety; most such features don't come from regulatory requirements, and even the mandated features would continue to exist in the absence of regulation, because people demand them. Advertising for vehicles often touts independent safety ratings as primary selling points. So, self-regulation works out very well when the target market wants it as a feature. It doesn't work well by itself when it provides no value to the target market.