4 ms·

You mean like a local MiTM? I vaguely remember firefox disabling the OS-wide trust store years ago for this very reason.

musicale 3y ago
Forged certificates (for gmail, etc.) are a terrible idea. I thought certificate stapling was implemented to shut this awful practice down.
- lifthrasiir 3y ago
  If you meant certificate pinning, HPKP is long gone and even when browsers supported HPKP they allowed enterprise certs anyway. In retrospect it was never satisfactorily solved because you can't distinguish a person willingly install them from an employee forced to install them.
  - extraduder_ire 3y ago
    It'd be nice to get a warning where the lock symbol goes at least, telling you that the connection is only secure because an additional cert got added. Maybe with an option to get warned when it first happens, so your browser doesn't just send along cookies. Worst thing to me about enterprise certs is when people get tricked into installing them because a captive portal says that's the only way they can get their iphone on the free wifi.
    - zzo38computer 3y ago
      I think it would be sense that the browser should never send cookies if the certificate changed unless the user specifies that the new certificate is valid for the existing cookies (or manually copies them if necessary, e.g. due to a different domain name or a different computer). This way, it willl be secure. HSTS is no good, but cookies being secure-only can help (although I dislike that cookie flag and think instead, it should be if the connection that sent the cookies to you is secure instead). I also think that, to save energy (and to work-around compatibility issues), you should be allowed to configure it to use insecure proxies for secure connections (usually these insecure proxies would run on your computer, or LAN, but this is not strictly required).
      - bombcar 3y ago
        I wonder if cookies could be encrypted with the public key of the sites certificate - then when/if the certificate rotates, the cookies are worthless. You’d have to login again, but they couldn’t be stolen silently.

musicale 3y ago

Forged certificates (for gmail, etc.) are a terrible idea. I thought certificate stapling was implemented to shut this awful practice down.

lifthrasiir 3y ago
If you meant certificate pinning, HPKP is long gone and even when browsers supported HPKP they allowed enterprise certs anyway. In retrospect it was never satisfactorily solved because you can't distinguish a person willingly install them from an employee forced to install them.
- extraduder_ire 3y ago
  It'd be nice to get a warning where the lock symbol goes at least, telling you that the connection is only secure because an additional cert got added. Maybe with an option to get warned when it first happens, so your browser doesn't just send along cookies. Worst thing to me about enterprise certs is when people get tricked into installing them because a captive portal says that's the only way they can get their iphone on the free wifi.
  - zzo38computer 3y ago
    I think it would be sense that the browser should never send cookies if the certificate changed unless the user specifies that the new certificate is valid for the existing cookies (or manually copies them if necessary, e.g. due to a different domain name or a different computer). This way, it willl be secure. HSTS is no good, but cookies being secure-only can help (although I dislike that cookie flag and think instead, it should be if the connection that sent the cookies to you is secure instead). I also think that, to save energy (and to work-around compatibility issues), you should be allowed to configure it to use insecure proxies for secure connections (usually these insecure proxies would run on your computer, or LAN, but this is not strictly required).
    - bombcar 3y ago
      I wonder if cookies could be encrypted with the public key of the sites certificate - then when/if the certificate rotates, the cookies are worthless. You’d have to login again, but they couldn’t be stolen silently.