3 ms·
But that’s just a regular phishing attack, and borders on social engineering. It’s even a bit harder than classic phishing because you never input your account
by smileybarry 3y ago
But that’s just a regular phishing attack, and borders on social engineering. It’s even a bit harder than classic phishing because you never input your account key other than at setup of the 1P app.
Your key or password aren’t even sent to 1Password, ever. Logging in is done by computing and sending a cryptographic proof, and both sides validate each other through those cryptographic challenges.
Again, a back door into 1P SaaS in this case is equivalent to a back door into any cloud storage service, e.g.: Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.
> They would only need to phish the user for two pieces of data; the 1Password password and the account key
I think there’s a misunderstanding here. You have an email, an alphanumeric account key and a password. There are 3 user details, effectively. Then, you can add 2FA, either via TOTP or FIDO2/Passkey. So a total of 3 factors: something you have (account key), something you know (password) and something else you have (a 2FA device).
- m1keil 3y agoWhile the encryption might be solid, if you have a security issue in a sensitive area such as the build environment, you cannot have any confidence in the app. I'm not saying that this is what happened here, just pointing out that there are other risks here which cannot be mitigated by strong encryption.
- a10c 3y agoThat extends to any and all applications. Nothing is stopping a local only Keepass installation from being exposed via a supply chain attack to start sending passwords to an attackers server. In fact, I trust 1Password's corporate infrastructure more than my own ability to lock down my personal devices.
- m1keil 3y agoI don't disagree. Just pointing out that "zero knowledge" isn't the cure for every security issue.