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> I was talking about what it takes to brute force a single key. If you have some insight to the tool that created the key you could, lots of systems have door

> I was talking about what it takes to brute force a single key. If you have some insight to the tool that created the key you could, lots of systems have doors by design, typically by creators or regulation for export. My main point though was that these keys will probably be found in the future. If they aren't broken then actually found, and that much concentration is too much. It creates a rug pull for an entire currency ecosystem. Other crypto coins are even worse in this aspect. > You are misunderstanding the orders of magnitude differences in modern encryption from some weak schemes of the past. You are basing this on modern tech. Making the same mistakes of people of the past. Right now I said AES-256 would take longer than the universe in existence, I get the orders of magnitude. I just think people base these ideas off of the present, not the future. > "some encryption from 40 years ago was weak, therefore all encryption is weak." Do you believe in 40 years we won't have advancements that may make this statement look silly? Right now they are secure, we don't know what is to come. That is besides the point though, the keys are dangerous as they are concentration of leverage/power of not just a stock, but a currency... > You are extrapolating off of something isn't a pattern in the first place. No one thought triple DES would last forever. You are making the same mistakes of time, you don't know what is to come and the past has shown previous algorithms actually last LESS time than they expected. It does play into it. Let's simplify this because you are lost in the weeds and resorting to ad hominems. Do you think it is a good idea that a currency has keys out there, that can be found either directly or with time, that have heavy concentration? Is concentrated unknown wealth of a currency, the root of all financial systems and power, a good idea?

CyberDildonics 3y ago
My main point though was that these keys will probably be found in the future. That's not at all what you said at first. You didn't say the keys would probably be found, you said with quantum computing someone will break the encryption, which is based on nothing. Here it is verbatim: Eventually with quantum computing or other advancements, someone will break the encryption and potentially swipe the part of Satoshi's coin. You are basing this on modern tech. Making the same mistakes of people of the past. You aren't getting this. This isn't a "what if computers are faster in the future" scenario. You aren't going to brute force a search space of this size with all the energy from all the stars in the universe. You are making the same mistakes of time, you don't know what is to come and the past has shown previous algorithms actually last LESS time than they expected. It does play into it. No, I actually understand the search space of large key lengths instead of hallucinating a fantasy future. Even when DES was created people debated it being too weak. You can go back a generation and read articles about cars so big they have their own wood shop, future cities full of flying cars and robot servants. That stuff was all more practical than what you are talking about. This would not be a conversation if you understood what you are saying. Let's simplify this because you are lost in the weeds and resorting to ad hominems. Pointing out that you have huge misunderstandings is not 'ad hominem'. Do you think it is a good idea that a currency has keys out there, that can be found either directly or with time, that have heavy concentration? Is concentrated unknown wealth of a currency, the root of all financial systems and power, a good idea? This has nothing to do with what I'm trying to tell you. You originally said that "quantum computers will be able to break satoshi's keys" and I'm trying to explain to you why that is naive and uninformed.
- Veserv 3y ago
  If you assume powerful quantum computers then Bitcoin is dead, that is a straightforward result. The digital signatures that prevent others from spending your bitcoins are based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The security of elliptic curve cryptography is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). A sufficiently powerful quantum computer can use a variant of Shor’s algorithm to solve the DLP in runtime polynomial in the key size (my research indicates O(n^3) in key size more or less), giving you the private key behind a bitcoin wallet in a very tractable amount of time. Though everything else they are saying about backdoors or design issues are wild speculation, a powerful quantum computer absolutely would allow you to spend anybody’s, including Satoshi Nakamoto’s, bitcoins.
  - greyface- 3y ago
    Single-use P2PKH addresses are quantum safe, since the public key is not revealed publicly until spending, just its hash. QC breaks ECDSA but not SHA256.
    - Veserv 3y ago
      Having just read up on it, sure. But that is a very restricted use case as you could only use your wallet for a single send transaction and that has already happened for the specific case of Satoshi's wallet. I believe you could scaffold up a system even with a 1-send limit that transparently functions the same as what currently exists since you can issue transactions to multiple parties within a single send, but that largely kills Bitcoin as normally used. All but the most sophisticated users would be required to hand over control of their wallet to actually manage the massive proliferation of addresses needed to act as if you have more than a 1-send limit. But sure, you are technically correct that there exists a very narrow use case which you can probably hijack aggressively enough to salvage the system if you tried hard enough.
      - greyface- 3y ago
        You're right that Satoshi's coins are at risk (but because they're using the older P2PK, not due to key reuse), and I agree that this would lead to some amount of chaos and transformative disruption. > users would be required to hand over control of their wallet to actually manage the massive proliferation of addresses needed BIP32 solved this in 2012, and is used by basically all self-custodial wallets these days. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawi...

CyberDildonics 3y ago

My main point though was that these keys will probably be found in the future. That's not at all what you said at first. You didn't say the keys would probably be found, you said with quantum computing someone will break the encryption, which is based on nothing. Here it is verbatim: Eventually with quantum computing or other advancements, someone will break the encryption and potentially swipe the part of Satoshi's coin. You are basing this on modern tech. Making the same mistakes of people of the past. You aren't getting this. This isn't a "what if computers are faster in the future" scenario. You aren't going to brute force a search space of this size with all the energy from all the stars in the universe. You are making the same mistakes of time, you don't know what is to come and the past has shown previous algorithms actually last LESS time than they expected. It does play into it. No, I actually understand the search space of large key lengths instead of hallucinating a fantasy future. Even when DES was created people debated it being too weak. You can go back a generation and read articles about cars so big they have their own wood shop, future cities full of flying cars and robot servants. That stuff was all more practical than what you are talking about. This would not be a conversation if you understood what you are saying. Let's simplify this because you are lost in the weeds and resorting to ad hominems. Pointing out that you have huge misunderstandings is not 'ad hominem'. Do you think it is a good idea that a currency has keys out there, that can be found either directly or with time, that have heavy concentration? Is concentrated unknown wealth of a currency, the root of all financial systems and power, a good idea? This has nothing to do with what I'm trying to tell you. You originally said that "quantum computers will be able to break satoshi's keys" and I'm trying to explain to you why that is naive and uninformed.

Veserv 3y ago
If you assume powerful quantum computers then Bitcoin is dead, that is a straightforward result. The digital signatures that prevent others from spending your bitcoins are based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The security of elliptic curve cryptography is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). A sufficiently powerful quantum computer can use a variant of Shor’s algorithm to solve the DLP in runtime polynomial in the key size (my research indicates O(n^3) in key size more or less), giving you the private key behind a bitcoin wallet in a very tractable amount of time. Though everything else they are saying about backdoors or design issues are wild speculation, a powerful quantum computer absolutely would allow you to spend anybody’s, including Satoshi Nakamoto’s, bitcoins.
- greyface- 3y ago
  Single-use P2PKH addresses are quantum safe, since the public key is not revealed publicly until spending, just its hash. QC breaks ECDSA but not SHA256.
  - Veserv 3y ago
    Having just read up on it, sure. But that is a very restricted use case as you could only use your wallet for a single send transaction and that has already happened for the specific case of Satoshi's wallet. I believe you could scaffold up a system even with a 1-send limit that transparently functions the same as what currently exists since you can issue transactions to multiple parties within a single send, but that largely kills Bitcoin as normally used. All but the most sophisticated users would be required to hand over control of their wallet to actually manage the massive proliferation of addresses needed to act as if you have more than a 1-send limit. But sure, you are technically correct that there exists a very narrow use case which you can probably hijack aggressively enough to salvage the system if you tried hard enough.
    - greyface- 3y ago
      You're right that Satoshi's coins are at risk (but because they're using the older P2PK, not due to key reuse), and I agree that this would lead to some amount of chaos and transformative disruption. > users would be required to hand over control of their wallet to actually manage the massive proliferation of addresses needed BIP32 solved this in 2012, and is used by basically all self-custodial wallets these days. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawi...