I feel like this leans too heavily into determinism. If we have no free will, and everything is predetermined based on previous states, then how many of these p

I feel like this leans too heavily into determinism. If we have no free will, and everything is predetermined based on previous states, then how many of these previous states do we need to know before we can determine the future? The argument feels very weak regardless. Of course current actions are affected by previous actions, but just because they were affected doesn't mean they were determined by the previous actions, so it seems wrong to argue against free will via causal chains. I don't suddenly lose my agency to choose something just because someone can figure out a plausible reason for me having made that choice. "We are all just causally linked flesh machines and nothing else, prove me wrong" feels like the opposite side of the "philosophy zombie" concept. One posits we have no choice, one posits there is nothing "making" choices, and both are much better relegated to thought experiments to prod people into thinking about how to make an argument against it. With that in mind, the article says: >Sapolsky, who describes himself as "majorly averse to interpersonal conflict,"..."I'm really, really, really trying not to sound like a combative jerk in the book," he said. "I deal with human complexities by going and living in a tent. So yeah, I'm not up for a lot of brawls about this." This book and idea seem like a window into a philosopher's life where he just tells you what he believes, explains a bit, but isn't going to defend his idea much because he's just sharing the idea, not trying to authoritatively state he "solved free will" or some similar ludicrous statement.