For multi tenant environments like a provider running VMs, preventing speculative execution attacks is a priority; otherwise someone can literally see what anot

For multi tenant environments like a provider running VMs, preventing speculative execution attacks is a priority; otherwise someone can literally see what another tenant is doing (and there are attack demos demonstrating it). Furthermore, the entire concept of paging and virtual memory is built around the concept of not letting one process see what the other one is doing; the described attacks in the prime+probe/flush+reload attacks are quite practical and could let some JS on a website steal passwords (though the information leak rate is a little lower than what you generally get by outright stealing credential files using malware, though that tends to show up on EDRs, whereas speculative execution attacks just show up as memory access patterns with fewer cache hits than what’s expected.) If we’re to say that you don’t need isolation, we could just drop paging and every process just have a view of every other process.