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Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV

Certain gain of function experiments, e.g. modifying an animal virus to be able to infect humans could create viruses that might behave very similar to SARS-CoV2 if leaked. We now know more about the potential consequences of such a leak, we have a full-blown pandemic as a benchmark. If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk.

shadowgovt 3y ago
Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an animal-jump, baed on research done on corpses retrieved from the arctic circle. H1N1 was an animal jump. HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump. If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump, that's still three deadly natural pandemics that we want this research to be able to prevent in the future.
- sterlind 3y ago
  Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
  - chaostheory 3y ago
    Humans would need less animal contact. To end this, you’d have to end the animal agriculture industry. I am not a vegan.
  - kosievdmerwe 3y ago
    I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers.
    - cbsmith 3y ago
      > I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. You have a very limited imagination. ;-) I assure you that extensive research into biological (not involving viruses), chemical, and nuclear weapons... and really a wide variety of weapons research is easily more dangerous. There's plenty of opportunity in other areas like materials science, genetics, etc., as well. > If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers. Now you'll want to have an ultra-secure means of transporting highly dangerous biological samples, not to mention research teams & observers, at very high speeds to the middle of a desert. Are you sure you've improved the risk profile?
      - Wowfunhappy 3y ago
        I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all.
        cbsmith 3y ago
        > I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. If you're worried about lab contamination, the risk is from the researchers moving amongst the population. I agree that you'd rather not, but I don't agree that regularly putting them on planes to and from major population centers really reduces the risk. > Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all. [Shrugs]. Some people are pro-pandemic.
  - shadowgovt 3y ago
    This paper at least [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8490979 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8490979] argues that GoF research (in particular done in 2015 regarding transplantation of spike proteins into SARS-CoV-1) was instrumental in prediction of the rate of mutation of the spike protein, which factors into models of virulence, reinfection, immunity, whether the spike is a viable target for creation of a vaccine at all, etc. It also therefore informs research spending; the hard data on being able to say "Hey, if this bat virus gene mixes with this human virus we're gonna have a bad time" can inform the kind of virology research we focus on, and the hard data on "We cultured a virus like this years before COVID-19 happened; here's how it behaved in the lab" informs what vaccination and detection approaches might be viable. I hate to say it (because I agree the risks are significant), but I suspect the need to use this as a tool to model both probable futures and not-yet-understood behaviors of viral mutation may be arguments in favor of continued GoF research, despite the risk. I concur with other commenters that maybe we should be putting this stuff in the wilderness behind service providers that must undergo quarantine procedure before returning to densely-populated areas.
    - nvm0n2 3y ago
      > instrumental in prediction of the rate of mutation of the spike protein The research must have been pretty misleading then, because all the experts appeared to be taken by surprise by the fact that it mutated at all, given their original plan was "two shots and done". Something that has now become promoting infinity boosters to a world that has stopped listening (uptake of the current round is extremely low). But again, why should we listen to claims about virology? People who have been living in ivory caves may not realize this, but it's been proven beyond all doubt that the entire profession engaged in a conspiracy against the public to mislead people about the likelihood of a lab experiment gone wrong. Not just the many authors of the proximal origins paper, but so the other scientists who saw this coverup happening in public and said nothing.
      - shadowgovt 3y ago
        Arguing over the origins was completely orthogonal discussion to figuring out how to mitigate spread and severity, and I think most virologists made the wise decision to stay out of a fundamentally political argument. It doesn't matter if the virus came from the moon as long as we can quarantine and vaccinate against it. And I'm sorry you feel misinformed, but nothing I read ever suggested anyone was taken by surprise by its mutagenic rate. To the extent experts thought it might be a "two shots and done" virus, they were overly optimistic about policy and vaccination uptake; were the vaccine manufactured and rolled out quickly enough and deployed globally, it could have been cut off from human reservoirs and died out, but a combination of logistics and public distrust meant we missed that window and now it's endemic. Its mutation rate pretty much guarantees it'll be with us indefinitely as long as the public has the stomach to tolerate that.
  - matthewdgreen 3y ago
    I don’t research viruses, so I can’t tell you if GoF is the right tool to fight a future pandemic or not. What I do know is that if a deadly virus with a 30% CFR is spreading rapidly, I want the experts fighting it to have every tool at their disposal. I don’t want them artificially handcuffed in finding a cure/vaccine by the feelings of some Hacker News posters like me and you. Happy to stipulate that this should be an emergency capability, but frankly I don’t know enough about the value of preemptive GoF research to determine whether that’s a good balance.
  - theGnuMe 3y ago
    Yes because despite the known risks we need to understand these viruses and what causes across species transmission so that we can prepare for future pandemics (even those caused by spillover mistakes) and what we learn may also prove useful in other applications. Otherwise we are in the dark with unknown unknowns which is not a good place. So the risk here of doing research is manageable.
    - ifyoubuildit 3y ago
      Then why wasn't it managed?
- nvm0n2 3y ago
  > that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines.
  - cbsmith 3y ago
    > According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. That's not true. > Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines. I can't imagine your basis for saying this. Virologists isolated the signature genetic sequences for COVID-19. That was the basis for the development of testing & vaccines for COVID-19 (...and if you think they aren't involved in development of tests and vaccines beyond that...).
    - nvm0n2 3y ago
      Sequencing is something done by many types of biologist, there's nothing special about virologists there. No, this is a profession that really should not exist at all. GoF was banned in the past without consequence beyond causing them to engage in coverups of their own psychotic experimentations, it can be banned again with no loss to humanity. COVID simply wouldn't have happened if these experiments were banned.
      - shadowgovt 3y ago
        There is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that COVID would not have happened if these experiments were banned.
      - cbsmith 3y ago
        > Sequencing is something done by many types of biologist, there's nothing special about virologists there. Sequencing can be done by a high school student in a lab. Of course, to obtain a sequence for a novel virus, you have to do a lot more than that, but let's pretend that's all you have to do; the fact remains that the sequencing wasn't done by a high school student in a lab, but by virologists. I agree that everything virologists do could be done by non-virologists. That doesn't mean that it's what happened, nor that it'd be a good idea.
- nextaccountic 3y ago
  > HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump Can you expand on the multi-virus infection thing?
  - winocm 3y ago
    https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3234451/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3234451/
- natch 3y ago
  > If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump These are not the only two options. An animal virus could be enhanced in a lab, then jump to humans, and then the “animal-jump” terminology is just a misdirection away from the lab work. “Human-made” as a term is a similar misdirection in this scenario, trying to make the human involvement claims sound overstated, again trying to point away from the lab. I’m not saying you are doing misdirection, but I think some people framing it that way are. I think it’s important to recognize the full nuance of what is likely in the middle, instead of just looking at highly unlikely and opposed extreme scenarios.
cbsmith 3y ago
> If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk. You're saying that without regard to the measure of risk, or what risks exist if we don't do those experiments.
- whythre 3y ago
  What risk could possibly be worse than a global pandemic? That seems to be what gain of function research purports to be studying to prevent- and in this case it appears that the research virus caused the very thing it was supposed to (indirectly) prevent.

shadowgovt 3y ago

Unfortunately, that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility. Because animal virii making the jump to humans is the risk factor the international epidemiology community tries to protect against, for the very reasons you've highlighted: the harm when it occurs and the frequency with which it occurs (rare, but often enough to create a once-a-century firestorm, at least). Spanish Flu was likely an animal-jump, baed on research done on corpses retrieved from the arctic circle. H1N1 was an animal jump. HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump. If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump, that's still three deadly natural pandemics that we want this research to be able to prevent in the future.

sterlind 3y ago
Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
- chaostheory 3y ago
  Humans would need less animal contact. To end this, you’d have to end the animal agriculture industry. I am not a vegan.
- kosievdmerwe 3y ago
  I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers.
  - cbsmith 3y ago
    > I literally can't think of a more dangerous kind of research that we could be doing as a species than messing around and making viruses more dangerous. You have a very limited imagination. ;-) I assure you that extensive research into biological (not involving viruses), chemical, and nuclear weapons... and really a wide variety of weapons research is easily more dangerous. There's plenty of opportunity in other areas like materials science, genetics, etc., as well. > If we really have to do it, then we can do it in the middle of a desert with quarantine procedures instead of near/in population centers. Now you'll want to have an ultra-secure means of transporting highly dangerous biological samples, not to mention research teams & observers, at very high speeds to the middle of a desert. Are you sure you've improved the risk profile?
    - Wowfunhappy 3y ago
      I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all.
      - cbsmith 3y ago
        > I assume the biological samples need to get transported at some point anyway. The researchers would need to live on-site. Yes this would dramatically increase the cost. If you're worried about lab contamination, the risk is from the researchers moving amongst the population. I agree that you'd rather not, but I don't agree that regularly putting them on planes to and from major population centers really reduces the risk. > Personally, I think we just shouldn't do this at all. [Shrugs]. Some people are pro-pandemic.
- shadowgovt 3y ago
  This paper at least [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8490979 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8490979] argues that GoF research (in particular done in 2015 regarding transplantation of spike proteins into SARS-CoV-1) was instrumental in prediction of the rate of mutation of the spike protein, which factors into models of virulence, reinfection, immunity, whether the spike is a viable target for creation of a vaccine at all, etc. It also therefore informs research spending; the hard data on being able to say "Hey, if this bat virus gene mixes with this human virus we're gonna have a bad time" can inform the kind of virology research we focus on, and the hard data on "We cultured a virus like this years before COVID-19 happened; here's how it behaved in the lab" informs what vaccination and detection approaches might be viable. I hate to say it (because I agree the risks are significant), but I suspect the need to use this as a tool to model both probable futures and not-yet-understood behaviors of viral mutation may be arguments in favor of continued GoF research, despite the risk. I concur with other commenters that maybe we should be putting this stuff in the wilderness behind service providers that must undergo quarantine procedure before returning to densely-populated areas.
  - nvm0n2 3y ago
    > instrumental in prediction of the rate of mutation of the spike protein The research must have been pretty misleading then, because all the experts appeared to be taken by surprise by the fact that it mutated at all, given their original plan was "two shots and done". Something that has now become promoting infinity boosters to a world that has stopped listening (uptake of the current round is extremely low). But again, why should we listen to claims about virology? People who have been living in ivory caves may not realize this, but it's been proven beyond all doubt that the entire profession engaged in a conspiracy against the public to mislead people about the likelihood of a lab experiment gone wrong. Not just the many authors of the proximal origins paper, but so the other scientists who saw this coverup happening in public and said nothing.
    - shadowgovt 3y ago
      Arguing over the origins was completely orthogonal discussion to figuring out how to mitigate spread and severity, and I think most virologists made the wise decision to stay out of a fundamentally political argument. It doesn't matter if the virus came from the moon as long as we can quarantine and vaccinate against it. And I'm sorry you feel misinformed, but nothing I read ever suggested anyone was taken by surprise by its mutagenic rate. To the extent experts thought it might be a "two shots and done" virus, they were overly optimistic about policy and vaccination uptake; were the vaccine manufactured and rolled out quickly enough and deployed globally, it could have been cut off from human reservoirs and died out, but a combination of logistics and public distrust meant we missed that window and now it's endemic. Its mutation rate pretty much guarantees it'll be with us indefinitely as long as the public has the stomach to tolerate that.
- matthewdgreen 3y ago
  I don’t research viruses, so I can’t tell you if GoF is the right tool to fight a future pandemic or not. What I do know is that if a deadly virus with a 30% CFR is spreading rapidly, I want the experts fighting it to have every tool at their disposal. I don’t want them artificially handcuffed in finding a cure/vaccine by the feelings of some Hacker News posters like me and you. Happy to stipulate that this should be an emergency capability, but frankly I don’t know enough about the value of preemptive GoF research to determine whether that’s a good balance.
- theGnuMe 3y ago
  Yes because despite the known risks we need to understand these viruses and what causes across species transmission so that we can prepare for future pandemics (even those caused by spillover mistakes) and what we learn may also prove useful in other applications. Otherwise we are in the dark with unknown unknowns which is not a good place. So the risk here of doing research is manageable.
  - ifyoubuildit 3y ago
    Then why wasn't it managed?
nvm0n2 3y ago
> that sort of GOF research is at the top of the list of GOF utility According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines.
- cbsmith 3y ago
  > According to the virologists who do it, not anyone else. That's not true. > Virologists conspicuously had no role in fighting COVID and didn't seem to contribute any particular knowledge to the NPIs or vaccines. I can't imagine your basis for saying this. Virologists isolated the signature genetic sequences for COVID-19. That was the basis for the development of testing & vaccines for COVID-19 (...and if you think they aren't involved in development of tests and vaccines beyond that...).
  - nvm0n2 3y ago
    Sequencing is something done by many types of biologist, there's nothing special about virologists there. No, this is a profession that really should not exist at all. GoF was banned in the past without consequence beyond causing them to engage in coverups of their own psychotic experimentations, it can be banned again with no loss to humanity. COVID simply wouldn't have happened if these experiments were banned.
    - shadowgovt 3y ago
      There is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that COVID would not have happened if these experiments were banned.
    - cbsmith 3y ago
      > Sequencing is something done by many types of biologist, there's nothing special about virologists there. Sequencing can be done by a high school student in a lab. Of course, to obtain a sequence for a novel virus, you have to do a lot more than that, but let's pretend that's all you have to do; the fact remains that the sequencing wasn't done by a high school student in a lab, but by virologists. I agree that everything virologists do could be done by non-virologists. That doesn't mean that it's what happened, nor that it'd be a good idea.
nextaccountic 3y ago
> HIV was a multi-virus infection followed by an animal jump Can you expand on the multi-virus infection thing?
- winocm 3y ago
  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3234451/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3234451/
natch 3y ago
> If COVID was human-made and not an animal-jump These are not the only two options. An animal virus could be enhanced in a lab, then jump to humans, and then the “animal-jump” terminology is just a misdirection away from the lab work. “Human-made” as a term is a similar misdirection in this scenario, trying to make the human involvement claims sound overstated, again trying to point away from the lab. I’m not saying you are doing misdirection, but I think some people framing it that way are. I think it’s important to recognize the full nuance of what is likely in the middle, instead of just looking at highly unlikely and opposed extreme scenarios.

cbsmith 3y ago

> If those experiments have a chance to repeat a similar pandemic, I don't think any of them are worth that risk. You're saying that without regard to the measure of risk, or what risks exist if we don't do those experiments.

whythre 3y ago
What risk could possibly be worse than a global pandemic? That seems to be what gain of function research purports to be studying to prevent- and in this case it appears that the research virus caused the very thing it was supposed to (indirectly) prevent.