8 ms·

Any benefit from research of gain of function research is clearly outweighed by risk of lab leak. I.e if the estimated incremental realized benefit of better pl

Any benefit from research of gain of function research is clearly outweighed by risk of lab leak. I.e if the estimated incremental realized benefit of better planning, better mitigation from a single gain of function research equaled X; the cost of a lab leak seems to be 100X~10,000X.

jsisto 3y ago
If it clearly outweighs the risks can you provide a study showing this? I can't seem to find any.
- somenameforme 3y ago
  Here's [1] a reasonable one. That list should be considered far from comprehensive, as it's extremely safe to assume that many events end up buried, especially given all of the grey-tier legality bio research happening in far off shores, researching who knows what. But looking at the reported events (that have made their way onto Wiki), since 2000 we've had lab leaks and "incidents" in the US (repeatedly.. to say the least), Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, UK, Australia, France, the Netherlands, and many more places. That includes incidents at BSL-4 labs, the highest biosecurity rating. And the leaks/incidents involve some pretty crazy stuff: polio - lab worker was infected without anyone's knowledge, ebola - lab worker infected at a BSL-4 lab, smallpox - vials of active smallpox found casually laying around in cold storage at a rando facility, anthrax - 75 exposed, and more. It seems completely obvious from the absurd volume of reported incidents that we're bee-lining to a global biosecurity accident, almost certainly far more serious than COVID, completely of our own making, again. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_laboratory_biosecurity_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_laboratory_biosecurity...
- yCombLinks 3y ago
  I can always rely on someone to here to make a useless comment demanding a study, thinking they have a point
tastyfreeze 3y ago
Gain of function research is the kind of experiment that could develop a disease that kills billions. It isn't a game we should be playing lightly if at all. The argument is that eventually biology could make the same mutation. The thing is, it is extremely unlikely that Ebola becomes air born naturally, for example. But that is the kind of thing that gain of function seeks to develop, you know, just in case.
- mkmk3 3y ago
  Naturally, there's an adversarial game playing out, and we accelerate it massively. If the results of our small games enter the larger playspace, we're damned, so I get your concern. Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Are the problems involved in understanding the systems involved (to the extent that you can predict realistic risk and mitigate) solvable? I don't know the level of realistic risk for a devastating virus naturally occurring, nor the potential for us to address it without this kind of research, so I don't know what is within reason here. It would be cool to see any studies that attempt to address these two questions. Edit: And a systematic review of past and considered lab leak scenarios probably wouldn't hurt either. If we still have to do this work, and just decide it must be done by isolated monks/robots in space, for humanity ending risks I guess that's worth discussing
  - jjoonathan 3y ago
    > Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Of course there is, of course they already use it, and of course the people who think banning research is the peak of enlightenment aren't remotely interested in making this kind of distinction.
    - mkmk3 3y ago
      More context please, you're alluding and I would genuinely appreciate it if you have it. If you don't I don't think this is a good comment to make
  - saalweachter 3y ago
cbsmith 3y ago
I'm not sure you establish the 100X-10,000X measure. How did you calculate the realized benefit? How do you quantify the relative impact of extinction?
- JoshTko 3y ago
  The approximate loss of life for major outbreaks in the past 25 years (excluding Covid) was around 500K. In a best case scenario GoF could have mitigated maybe 20% of that or 100k. Let' say one research initiative as r, the chance of that research being successful as s, the chance of that research being on the exact virus causing the outbreak as v, the type of mutation research being the actual mutation the virus had as m, the chance that the government leveraged the research and took action to prepare accordingly to take advantage of that research as g, we get s * v * m * g = P probability of r mitigating outbreaks by 20%. P of r is probably around 1/100 or less. So you would probably want around at least 100 GOF research initiatives to save ~100K lives. On the surface that might sound ok. However if we undergo a similar exercise of chances of Lab leak causing an outbreak we'll probably end up with a similar figure of 1/100. In a lab leak we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen that has caused a prior outbreak which may kill an order more people than the average outbreak. So perhaps a million deaths alone, or if we entertain that Covid was caused by a lab lead ~10m deaths, or 100x of 100k. Ultimately it seems GoF research is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduces total deaths on net. A much more effective route seems to simply invest in rapid sequencing, rapid wastewater monitoring, PPE stocking/distribution policies, more effective local lockdown procedures/policies.
  - cbsmith 3y ago
    I'm not sure I followed your reasoning entirely. You mention rapid sequencing, rapid wastewater monitoring, PPE stocking/distribution policies, and more effective local lockdown procedures/policies. Those would all be factors that would reduce the value of "X" (as in, the consequences of bad outcomes in either scenario), rather than any coefficients in front of X. I don't necessarily agree that the past 25 years, particularly if you are excluding COVID, is a meaningful representative sample... unless you want to compare it to the loss of life from GoF over the past 25 years excluding COVID. In that case, I'd challenge you to demonstrate a loss of life from GoF research that is over 10K. Given the ~100K lives estimate, that puts it at 10x greater benefit than not doing GoF research. > However if we undergo a similar exercise of chances of Lab leak causing an outbreak we'll probably end up with a similar figure of 1/100. In a lab leak we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen that has caused a prior outbreak which may kill an order more people than the average outbreak. There's a number of false assumptions here. Your threat assessment seems more rooted in works of fiction than reality. That the probability is equivalent is highly debatable, particularly since it is far easier (and cheaper) to apply risk mitigations to a virology lab than to society as a whole. It's also not a given that a lab leak means we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen. Even if it were a more powerful variant of a pathogen, that does not necessarily relate to a higher death toll. In fact, SARS-COV-2 was far less virulent than SARS-COV-1, and that's a significant contributor to why it had so much more impact. Even if we ignore ALL of that, in the even that there was an outbreak from a virology lab doing GoF research, that would mean we would be much further ahead on research to combat the virus than if said virus were to occur in the wild. We'd have shorter times to have disease profiles, tests, epidemiological models, and vaccines, and the impact of shorter times is exponential. While it is conceivable that a leak from a lab leads to a higher death count, it is far more conceivable that a virus that didn't come from a lab would end more lives. > if we entertain that Covid was caused by a lab lead ~10m deaths, or 100x of 100k. Spanish flu, which existed before anyone knew how to do GoF research, killed far more people than COVID-19. At the lowest estimate, it's about 17 million people, and at the high end closer to 100 million people. The population of the world at the time was ~1/4 the population when COVID-19 hit the scene, so on a per capita basis COVID-19 isn't in the same league. AIDS, which we've been able to track back to its natural origin, has killed 42 million people. The Bubonic Plague killed... 75+ million, or about a third of the European population. Nature is way better at killing us than any lab. > Ultimately it seems GoF research is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduces total deaths on net. Another way to think of it is that international trade & travel is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduce total deaths or not. We could therefore return to the days of the horse and buggy, or we could continue with the practice and put in place mitigations, like GoF research, to mitigate the risks it entails.

jsisto 3y ago

If it clearly outweighs the risks can you provide a study showing this? I can't seem to find any.

somenameforme 3y ago
Here's [1] a reasonable one. That list should be considered far from comprehensive, as it's extremely safe to assume that many events end up buried, especially given all of the grey-tier legality bio research happening in far off shores, researching who knows what. But looking at the reported events (that have made their way onto Wiki), since 2000 we've had lab leaks and "incidents" in the US (repeatedly.. to say the least), Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, UK, Australia, France, the Netherlands, and many more places. That includes incidents at BSL-4 labs, the highest biosecurity rating. And the leaks/incidents involve some pretty crazy stuff: polio - lab worker was infected without anyone's knowledge, ebola - lab worker infected at a BSL-4 lab, smallpox - vials of active smallpox found casually laying around in cold storage at a rando facility, anthrax - 75 exposed, and more. It seems completely obvious from the absurd volume of reported incidents that we're bee-lining to a global biosecurity accident, almost certainly far more serious than COVID, completely of our own making, again. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_laboratory_biosecurity_incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_laboratory_biosecurity...
yCombLinks 3y ago
I can always rely on someone to here to make a useless comment demanding a study, thinking they have a point

tastyfreeze 3y ago

Gain of function research is the kind of experiment that could develop a disease that kills billions. It isn't a game we should be playing lightly if at all. The argument is that eventually biology could make the same mutation. The thing is, it is extremely unlikely that Ebola becomes air born naturally, for example. But that is the kind of thing that gain of function seeks to develop, you know, just in case.

mkmk3 3y ago
Naturally, there's an adversarial game playing out, and we accelerate it massively. If the results of our small games enter the larger playspace, we're damned, so I get your concern. Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Are the problems involved in understanding the systems involved (to the extent that you can predict realistic risk and mitigate) solvable? I don't know the level of realistic risk for a devastating virus naturally occurring, nor the potential for us to address it without this kind of research, so I don't know what is within reason here. It would be cool to see any studies that attempt to address these two questions. Edit: And a systematic review of past and considered lab leak scenarios probably wouldn't hurt either. If we still have to do this work, and just decide it must be done by isolated monks/robots in space, for humanity ending risks I guess that's worth discussing
- jjoonathan 3y ago
  > Is there some scifi solution to step outside of the game? Of course there is, of course they already use it, and of course the people who think banning research is the peak of enlightenment aren't remotely interested in making this kind of distinction.
  - mkmk3 3y ago
    More context please, you're alluding and I would genuinely appreciate it if you have it. If you don't I don't think this is a good comment to make
- saalweachter 3y ago

cbsmith 3y ago

I'm not sure you establish the 100X-10,000X measure. How did you calculate the realized benefit? How do you quantify the relative impact of extinction?

JoshTko 3y ago
The approximate loss of life for major outbreaks in the past 25 years (excluding Covid) was around 500K. In a best case scenario GoF could have mitigated maybe 20% of that or 100k. Let' say one research initiative as r, the chance of that research being successful as s, the chance of that research being on the exact virus causing the outbreak as v, the type of mutation research being the actual mutation the virus had as m, the chance that the government leveraged the research and took action to prepare accordingly to take advantage of that research as g, we get s * v * m * g = P probability of r mitigating outbreaks by 20%. P of r is probably around 1/100 or less. So you would probably want around at least 100 GOF research initiatives to save ~100K lives. On the surface that might sound ok. However if we undergo a similar exercise of chances of Lab leak causing an outbreak we'll probably end up with a similar figure of 1/100. In a lab leak we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen that has caused a prior outbreak which may kill an order more people than the average outbreak. So perhaps a million deaths alone, or if we entertain that Covid was caused by a lab lead ~10m deaths, or 100x of 100k. Ultimately it seems GoF research is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduces total deaths on net. A much more effective route seems to simply invest in rapid sequencing, rapid wastewater monitoring, PPE stocking/distribution policies, more effective local lockdown procedures/policies.
- cbsmith 3y ago
  I'm not sure I followed your reasoning entirely. You mention rapid sequencing, rapid wastewater monitoring, PPE stocking/distribution policies, and more effective local lockdown procedures/policies. Those would all be factors that would reduce the value of "X" (as in, the consequences of bad outcomes in either scenario), rather than any coefficients in front of X. I don't necessarily agree that the past 25 years, particularly if you are excluding COVID, is a meaningful representative sample... unless you want to compare it to the loss of life from GoF over the past 25 years excluding COVID. In that case, I'd challenge you to demonstrate a loss of life from GoF research that is over 10K. Given the ~100K lives estimate, that puts it at 10x greater benefit than not doing GoF research. > However if we undergo a similar exercise of chances of Lab leak causing an outbreak we'll probably end up with a similar figure of 1/100. In a lab leak we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen that has caused a prior outbreak which may kill an order more people than the average outbreak. There's a number of false assumptions here. Your threat assessment seems more rooted in works of fiction than reality. That the probability is equivalent is highly debatable, particularly since it is far easier (and cheaper) to apply risk mitigations to a virology lab than to society as a whole. It's also not a given that a lab leak means we'll have to contend with a more powerful variant of a pathogen. Even if it were a more powerful variant of a pathogen, that does not necessarily relate to a higher death toll. In fact, SARS-COV-2 was far less virulent than SARS-COV-1, and that's a significant contributor to why it had so much more impact. Even if we ignore ALL of that, in the even that there was an outbreak from a virology lab doing GoF research, that would mean we would be much further ahead on research to combat the virus than if said virus were to occur in the wild. We'd have shorter times to have disease profiles, tests, epidemiological models, and vaccines, and the impact of shorter times is exponential. While it is conceivable that a leak from a lab leads to a higher death count, it is far more conceivable that a virus that didn't come from a lab would end more lives. > if we entertain that Covid was caused by a lab lead ~10m deaths, or 100x of 100k. Spanish flu, which existed before anyone knew how to do GoF research, killed far more people than COVID-19. At the lowest estimate, it's about 17 million people, and at the high end closer to 100 million people. The population of the world at the time was ~1/4 the population when COVID-19 hit the scene, so on a per capita basis COVID-19 isn't in the same league. AIDS, which we've been able to track back to its natural origin, has killed 42 million people. The Bubonic Plague killed... 75+ million, or about a third of the European population. Nature is way better at killing us than any lab. > Ultimately it seems GoF research is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduces total deaths on net. Another way to think of it is that international trade & travel is playing with fire without knowing if the effort actually will reduce total deaths or not. We could therefore return to the days of the horse and buggy, or we could continue with the practice and put in place mitigations, like GoF research, to mitigate the risks it entails.